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The paper studies a simple voting system that has the potential to increase the power of 
minorities without sacrificing aggregate efficiency. Storable votes grant each voter a stock of 
votes to spend as desired over a series of binary decisions. By accumulating votes on issues 
that it deems most important, the minority can win occasionally. But because the majority 
typically can outvote it, the minority wins only if its strength of preference is high and the 
majority’s strength of preference is low. The result is that with storable votes, aggregate 
efficiency either falls little or in fact rises. The theoretical predictions of our model are 
confirmed by a series of experiments: the frequency of minority victories, the relative payoff 
of the minority versus the majority, and the aggregate payoffs all match the theory. 
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Recent decades have witnessed great eﬀorts at designing democratic institutions,
at many levels. New constitutions were created in much of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Republics, international organizations such as the European
Union and the World Trade Organization have been evolving rapidly, and many
developing countries have moved from autocratic regimes to regimes based on
elected representation with majoritarian principles.
While majoritarian principles may provide a solid foundation for democ-
racy, there are imperfections. This paper focuses on one particular imperfec-
tion, which has presented a challenge to designers of democratic institutions for
centuries: the tyranny of the majority, or the risk of excluding minority groups
from representation. At least since Madison, Mill, and Tocqueville, political
thinkers have argued that a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a demo-
cratic system is for no group with acceptable goals to be disenfranchised. The
dangers posed by the tyranny of the majority are not of pure academic interest,
as the threat or reality of civil wars around the world makes painfully clear.
According to a leading constitutional law textbook: "This issue is one of
the most diﬃcult in political and constitutional theory: how to design political
institutions that both reﬂect the right of "the people" to be self-governing and
that also ensure appropriate integration of and respect for the interests of polit-
ical minorities" (Issacharoﬀ, Karlan and Pildes, 2002, p.673). In the history of
US constitutional law, ensuring fair representation to each group is seen as the
crucial second step in the evolution of democratic institutions, after granting
the franchise: once all individuals are guaranteed the right to participate in the
political process, the question becomes the appropriate weights given to each
group’s political interest. The core of the diﬃculty is that the two goals seem
inherently contradictory.
One possible remedy is recourse to the judiciary system: it amounts to guar-
anteeing basic rights in the fundamental laws of the country and appealing to
the courts when such rights are imperiled. Although this approach can prevent
abuses, it does not address the subtler problem of ensuring minority represen-
tation when the preferences of the minority, as opposed to its basic rights, are
sytematically neglected. For this, the correct design of the political institutions
is required. In this paper, we approach the problem from the perspective of
voting theory, and propose a simple voting mechanism that, without violating
the basic principle of "one-person one-vote," allows the minority to win occa-
sionally. The mechanism is not based on supermajorities, avoiding the costs of
inertia and ineﬃciency they can entail, nor on geographical partitions, with the
inevitable arbitrariness and instability of redistricting. But before describing
our solution to the tyranny of the majority problem some clariﬁcation is useful.
The topic of minorities is felt so intensely, and the terms are so emotionally
loaded that there is a need to be scrupulously clear in terminology. We deﬁne
a minority as a clearly identiﬁable group characterized by two features: ﬁrst,
a small numerical size, smaller than the majority; second, preferences that are
systematically diﬀerent from the preferences of the majority. Thus, a minor-
1ity in this paper is a political minority, which may, but need not, correspond
to a minority according to racial, ethnic, religious or any other type of con-
siderations. In terms of political decisions, what matters are the coherent and
idiosyncratic preferences of the group, as opposed to its sense of identity. Given
our deﬁnition of a minority the natural question is why is protection of such a
minority important? A simple example will illustrate why.
Suppose there are just two groups in a polity comprised of 100 citizens.
Group A has 55 members and group B has 45 members. There are 3 issues for
which a policy must be adopted, and for each issue there are only two policy
options, α and β. All citizens in group A have identical preferences and strictly
prefer α to β; all citizens in group B have identical preferences and strictly
prefer β to α. Thus, group B ﬁts our deﬁnition of a minority. Table 1 gives
as p e c i ﬁc utility function for each member on each issue, and preferences are
assumed to be additive. For each citizen, the utility of the less preferred option
is normalized to 0. Thus, for example, if policy α were chosen for issue 1 and
policy β were chosen for issues 2 and 3, then each A citizen would have utility
equal to 3 and each B citizen would have a utility equal to 5.




Note that the intensity of preferences varies across the issues, and on a given
issue the preference intensity for a group A member may be diﬀerent from the
intensity of a group B member. That is, some issues are "more important" to
one group than to the other group - issue 1 is important to group A but not to
group B, and issue 3 is important to group B but not to group A.
Now consider what would happen with simple majority rule if issues are
decided independently? In that case, since group A has a majority, policy α
is adopted on all three issues. Indeed, even if there were a million diﬀerent
issues, group A would always have a majority on all issues, so the B citizens are
eﬀectively disenfranchised - the outcome is exactly the same as it would be in a
political system where only A citizens were allowed to vote.
Why is this outcome undesirable? There are at least two reasons. First,
equity considerations demand that the minority be able to win on at least some
issues. Second, from a purely utilitarian standpoint, there are plausible welfare
criteria according to which the outcome is socially ineﬃcient. In our example,
if each individual is treated equally and decisions are evaluated ex ante, before
membership into the groups is known, β should be chosen on issue 3.T h u s ,t h e
tyranny of the majority imposes costs both in terms of equity and in terms of ef-
ﬁciency. The equity problem stems from the existence of a smaller group whose
preferences are systematically in the opposite direction of the larger group’s
preferences. The eﬃciency problem stems from diﬀerences in the strength of
preferences of the two groups. But nothing fundamental depends on all citizens
in a group having the same intensity of preferences on every issue, a simpliﬁca-
2tion we adopted here to keep the example transparent.1
Can the tyranny of the majority problem be solved? In our example, una-
nimity or any biting supermajority requirement would produce a stalemate and
prevent any decision being made. Any solution must deviate from issue-by-issue
simple majority voting system. An immediate possibility might be vote trading
or some corresponding log-rolling scheme: members of one group could trade
t h e i rv o t eo no n ei s s u ei ne x c h a n g ef o rv o t e so no t h e ri s s u e s .B u t ,i nt h es i m p l e
example we constructed above, there are no gains across groups, because every
A citizen is already winning on all issues. Any system that allows the minority
group to win on even one issue will make all A citizens worse oﬀ, and thus would
not emerge spontaneously through vote trading. With the perfect correlation
of preferences we have posited above, an explicit institution "re-enfranchising"
the minority is necessary.
Consider then, endowing every voter with an initial stock of votes, and rather
than requiring voters to cast exactly one vote on each issue, allowing them to
lump their votes together, casting "heavier" votes on some issues and "lighter"
votes on other issues. It is this voting mechanism, called storable votes,t h a t
we study in this paper. As we prove below, storable votes allow the minority
to win some of the time, and in particular, to win when its preferences are
most intense. And because the majority generally holds more votes, it is in a
position to overrule the minority if it cares to do so: the minority can win only
those issues over which its strength of preferences is high and,a tt h es a m et i m e ,
the majority’s preference intensity is weak. But these are exactly the issues
where the minority "should" win from an eﬃciency viewpoint: the equity gains
resulting from the possibility of occasional minority’s victory need not come at
a cost to aggregate eﬃciency. In fact, in most of the examples we study in this
paper, we ﬁnd that standard economic measures of aggregate eﬃciency rise with
storable votes.
Storable votes were initially proposed in Casella (2005) which applied the
mechanism to an environment without systematic minorities. The desirable eﬃ-
ciency properties of storable votes remain true there, because the basic principle
of casting more votes over decisions that matter more continues to apply. The
implication is that the probability of obtaining the desired outcome shifts away
from decisions that matter little and towards decisions that matter more, with
positive welfare eﬀects. Storable votes are a particularly natural application
of the idea that preferences can be elicited by linking independent decisions
through a common budget constraint, an idea that can be exploited quite gen-
erally, as shown by Jackson and Sonnenschein (forthcoming).2 When applied to
1Nothing fundamental depends on the direction of preferences within the group being
perfectly correlated either - there may be some conﬂicting preferences within groups. We
have maintained the assumption throughout the paper, both to avoid complications and to
capture the focus of minority advocates on cohesive groups.
2Jackson and Sonnenschein propose a speciﬁc mechanism that converges to the ﬁrst best
allocation as the number of decisions grows large. The mechanism allows individuals to
assign diﬀerent priority to diﬀerent actions but constrains their choices in a tighly speciﬁed
manner. The design of the correct menu of choices oﬀered to the agents is complex and the
informational requirements on the planner severe, but the mechanism achieves the ﬁrst best.
3the problem of ensuring representation to systematic minorities, the potential
to increase eﬃciency is matched by desirable properties on equity grounds.
The observation that storable votes can be useful in increasing minority rep-
resentation is not surprising. One existing voting system similar to storable
votes is cumulative voting, a mechanism used in single multi-candidate elec-
tions. It grants each voter a budget of votes, with the proviso that the votes
can spread or concentrated on as many or few of the candidates as the voter
wishes. Cumulative voting has been advocated for the protection of minority
rights (Guinier, 1994) and has been recommended by the courts to redress vio-
lations of fair representation in local elections (Issacharoﬀ, Karlan and Pildes,
2002). There is evidence, theoretical (Cox, 1990), experimental (Gerber, Mor-
ton and Rietz, 1998), and empirical (Bowler, Donovan and Brockington, 2003)
that cumulative voting does indeed work in the direction intended. The stor-
able votes mechanism is diﬀerent in that it is applies to a series of independent
binary decisions, but the motivation is similar.
The desirable properties of storable votes are features of the equilibrium
of the resulting voting game — they emerge if every voter chooses the correct
number of votes, given what he rationally expects others to do. But, in practice
there is a need to consider the robustness of the mechanisms. Could the outcome
be much worse if voters made mistakes? This is an appropriate concern here
because the storable votes game is quite complex: to solve it fully, voters need
to trade-oﬀ the diﬀerent probabilities of casting the pivotal vote along the full
logical tree of possible scenarios. If actual voters were confronted with the
problem, what type of decisions would they make?
The second part of the paper presents the results of a set of experiments. In
our experiments, the minority does indeed win with some frequency, and both
the minority payoﬀ and the aggregate eﬃciency of the mechanism are close
to the theoretical predictions. The result is particularly remarkable because
the same cannot be said of individual strategies: the experimental subjects
deviate frequently from the equilibrium number of votes. What subjects do quite
consistently, though, is to cast more votes when valuations are higher, a behavior
that appears suﬃcient to take them most of the way towards their equilibrium
payoﬀs. These conclusions are qualiﬁed by the diﬀerent cost of mistakes faced
by majority members, who are likely to win anyway, and minority members,
whose deviations are particularly costly. This reinforces the robustness ﬁndings
reported in a diﬀerent storable votes experiment (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey,
forthcoming). The introduction of minorities complicates the game signiﬁcantly,
and we ﬁnd the replication of these results an encouraging sign of the practical
viability of the mechanism.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the basic model,
including a description of the storable votes mechanism and our deﬁnition of
eﬃciency. In section 3, we present theoretical results about the possibility of
minority victories and its eﬀect on eﬃciency under storable votes. Section 4
Storable votes are simple but in general do not achieve the ﬁrst best. (An exception is the
two-voter two-decision case, studied in Hortala-Vallve, 2004).
4describes the experimental design and section 5 the experimental results. We
conclude in section 6. The Appendix discusses some of the proofs.
2 The Model
A committee with n members meets for T consecutive periods to make a se-
quence of binary decisions, {d1,...dT},w h e r edt ∈ {αt,βt}. One can think of
these decisions as being policies for diﬀerent issues, a collection of referenda that
are voted on over a sequence of elections, a policy decision that must be revis-
ited periodically on a recurring basis by a board of policy makers, a sequence
of judges (or other appointees) to be voted up or down by a legislature, job
candidates that are considered annually by a recruiting committee, or various
other applications. For consistency, we will refer to these as proposals.I f t h e
decision in period t is αt, we say proposal t passes;i ft h ed e c i s i o ni sβt,w es a y
proposal t fails.
Voter i’s preferences over decision dt are summarized by a value vit ∈ R.
A positive value means that the voter is in favor of the proposal (for αt), a
negative value means that the voter is against (or for βt), and voter i’s payoﬀ
from each decision is given by |vit| ≡ vit i ft h eo u t c o m eo ft h ev o t ei sa sh e








vit > 0 and dt ∈ αt
vit < 0 and dt ∈ βt
=0 otherwise
The magnitude of the value, vit, measures the intensity of preferences of voter
i on proposal t.
The proﬁle of values, v=( v11,...,v1T,..,vn1,...,vnT) is a random variable
that is distributed according to the commonly known distribution Γ(v).T o
keep matters simple, we further assume that the proﬁle of values at time t,
vt, is drawn independently from the values at time t0 and from an identical
distribution, denoted G. We will capture our focus on systematically opposed
groups by specializing the assumptions on G.
The committee is composed of two groups, called M,w i t hM members and
m,w i t hm members, where m+M = n and m<M. We refer to M as the Ma-
jority group and m as the Minority group. The two groups diﬀer systematically
in their preferences. Members of m strictly prefer αt to βt and members of M
strictly prefer βt to αt, for all t, or, in our terminology, members of m are in
favor of all proposals, and members of M are against: majority members have
positive values for all proposals, while minority members have negative values
5for all proposals:
vit > 0 if i ∈ m
< 0 if i ∈ M
What matters is that the two groups’ preferences are always opposed. The
direction of the preferences is thus what deﬁnes the two groups: always iden-
tical within each group, and always opposed across groups. The direction of
preferences is common knowledge.
All members of the minority have values distributed according to the same
distribution Gm deﬁned over the support [0,1] while all members of the major-
ity have values distributed according to GM,d e ﬁned over the support [−1,0].
Therefore, the set of possible value proﬁles is V =[ 0 ,1]m×[−1,0]M.W ea s s u m e
symmetry in the distribution across groups, so that if we call G0
M(v) deﬁned over
the support [0,1] the distribution of the absolute valuations of the majority, we
set Gm(v)=G0
M(v) ≡ F(v). F(v) is common knowledge.
F(v) is thus the distribution of the intensity of preferences, assumed identical
for the two groups. Intensities of preferences are drawn independently across
the two groups. With respect to the correlation of the intensity of preferences
within each group, we consider two polar cases. In the ﬁr s tc a s e( w h i c hw ec a l l
the base case or B), intensities are drawn independently for each member of a
group; in the second case (the correlated case, or C) intensities are identical for
all members of each group. Thus, in the B case, all minority group members are
always in favor of a proposal but generally feel diﬀerently about its importance,
and similarly (with the opposite sign) for all members of the majority. In the
C case, not only do all minority members favor a proposal but all feel equally
strongly about it (and similarly for the majority). The correlation of preference
intensities within each group is common knowledge.
The direction of all voters’ preferences is known; but what is not known -
and is the essence of our model - is the intensity of these preferences v.A t
the beginning of period t, i privately observes vit but does not observe vit0 for
t0 >t : intensities are revealed privately and sequentially. Because draws are
independent across times, voter i’s observation of vit does not provide informa-
tion about vit0, and because draws are independent across groups, observation
of vm does not provide information about vM (and vice versa). Thus, voters
do not know the intensity of their own preferences in future periods and do not
know the intensity of preferences of the other group. In case C, group members
have identical preferences and thus they know the intensity of preferences for
all members of their group. In case B, they do not know the intensity of their
fellow group member’s preferences. This means that in the B case members of
t h es a m eg r o u pc a nh a v ec o n ﬂicting priorities, while they do not in the C case.
Given these assumptions about preferences, we next turn to decision rules.
The model is designed to address the relative performance of alternative decision
rules. A decision rule, D, is a mapping from proﬁl e so fv a l u e st oa no u t c o m ei n
each period. That is:
D : v 7→ (d1(v),...dT(v))
6There are several alternative ways to deﬁne the eﬃciency of decision rules. For
this paper, we consider only ex ante eﬃciency. Given a decision rule D,t h e





A decision rule D0 is Ex Ante Eﬃcient if and only if there does not exist another
decision rule D such that Ui(D) ≥ Ui(D0) for all i and Ui(D) > Ui(D0) for
some i. Similarly, decision rule D0 is Ex Ante Superior to D if and only if
Ui(D0) ≥ Ui(D) for all i and Ui(D0) > Ui(D) for some i.
From Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), the deﬁnition of ex ante eﬃciency
can be rewritten in terms of welfare functions, using a set of type-independent
welfare weights, one for each individual: a decision rule D0 is ex ante eﬃcient
if and only if there exists a collection of welfare weights, λ =( λ1,...,λ n) with
λi ≥ 0 for all i and
P
i λi =1 , such that D0 ∈ argmaxD∈∆{
P
i λiUi(D)},w h e r e
∆ is the set of all decision rules.
Notice an immediate implication of this deﬁnition. In our model, where the
interests of the two groups are always opposed, a possible candidate decision
rule is one that always favors one side - for example the majority, as with simple
majority voting. But if the distributions of values have full support, such a rule
c a nb ee xa n t ee ﬃcient only if the welfare weights on the losing group equal
zero. If we focus on welfare functions that place positive welfare weights on all
individuals, any optimal decision rule must decide in favor of the minority when
the values of the members of the minority are high enough relative to the values
of the members of the majority. With positive welfare weights, simple majority
voting cannot be ex ante eﬃcient. In what follows, we will focus on neutral
welfare functions - welfare functions such that the welfare weight assigned to
each individual equals 1
n.
2.1 Some observations on the model
The values in our model are cardinal, and since there is no private good in
the model some discussion about their interpretation is warranted. One way to
interpret the values is in terms of willingness to pay relative to an unmodelled
numeraire private good.
That is, in the example in the introduction, a member of group M is will-
ing to give up one unit of the private good to change the outcome proﬁle from
(α,α,α) to (β,α,α), but is willing to give up two units of the private good to
change the outcome proﬁle from (α,α,α) to (α,β,α). A second interpretation
is in terms of von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions, as it applies to pref-
erences over lotteries. In fact, we treat the utilities as such when calculating
expected payoﬀs to the players. Because players face uncertainty about other
players’ values and their own future values, this is important. Thus, in our
example, a member of group M is indiﬀerent between a 50/50 lottery between
(α,α,β) and (β,α,α) and the certain outcome (α,β,α).
7An important question is whether the cardinal values and our notion of
eﬃciency force us into comparisons of interpersonal utilities. It is here that our
assumption of symmetrical distributions of (absolute) values across all voters
plays its role: all voters are identical ex ante, and the valuation draws over any
speciﬁcd e c i s i o ns h o u l db er e a da sn o r m a l i z e db yac o m m o nn u m e r a i r e .I no u r
model with multiple decisions, the natural numeraire is the individual’s mean
valuation over the universe of all decisions that could be brought to a vote. In
fact, by imposing not only the same mean but the same distribution, we are
forcing the voters to adopt an equal scale and to organize the diﬀerent decisions
according to a ﬁxed ordinal ranking, with the same proportion of decisions in
any given subinterval of the support. To see why the alternative model would
be problematic, suppose for example that the distribution of valuations for all
members of M were uniform on [0,2] and the distribution of valuations for all
members of m were uniform on [0,1]. On what basis could we justify assigning
preferences that on average are twice as intense for members of M than for
members of m?
Note that, not only would there be an arbitrary inconsistency in the assign-
ment of preferences, but such an inconsistency would be reﬂected in our notion
of eﬃciency. The equal welfare weights we posit reﬂect the natural focus on
egalitarian decision rules, but the term "egalitarian" is appropriate only if the
distribution of preference intensities is the same for everyone. In this example,
the "egalitarian" welfare function would implicitly give more weight to members
of M! Indeed, an egalitarian decision rule would correspond to the ex ante eﬃ-
cient decision rule for an environment where the weights on members of M are
double the weights for members of m, and both distributions are uniform [0,1].
The result would be to distort the whole idea of intensity, which is not intended
to reﬂect interpersonal comparisons, but rather a comparison of strength of pref-
erence across issues for a single voter. When FM = Fm, the normative problem
of whether an egalitarian welfare function is really egalitarian is avoided.
2.2 The Storable Votes Mechanism
Diﬀerent versions of the storable votes mechanism are described in detail in
Casella (2005) and Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey (forthcoming). We consider
here the version described in the latter paper. At the beginning of period 1,
each voter is endowed with an account of B0 "bonus" votes3;i nt h eﬁrst period,
the voter casts his regular vote plus as many bonus votes as he wishes out of
his endowment. This number of votes is deducted from the account, which is
then carried over to the next period. The current endowment of bonus votes for
every voter in period t, denoted Bt =( B1t,...,Bnt), is common knowledge at
the beginning of period t. Thus each voter i independently decides how many
votes, xit, to cast after observing his private valuation vit and Bt, subject to
xit ≤ 1+Bit. The proposal passes (i.e. dt = αt) if there are more votes for αt
3An obvious generalization would be to allow diﬀerent voters to have diﬀerent initial allo-
cations of bonus votes.
8than for the status quo βt. The status quo prevails (i.e. dt = βt)i ft h e r ea r e
more votes for βt than for αt. Ties are resolved randomly. In the next period,
t+1, voters’ valuations over the new proposal are again privately observed, and
voting proceeds as before, now subject to the constraint, xit+1 ≤ 1+Bit+1 =
2+Bit − xit.S i n c exit ≥ 1, this is at least as tight a constraint as in period t.
The voting continues in this fashion until the end of period T.
3T h e o r e t i c a l r e s u l t s
3.1 Equilibrium
Given F,m,M,B0,T the storable votes mechanism deﬁnes a multistage game
of incomplete information. We study the properties of the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria of this game, where at each period t and for each possible valuation,
vit, individuals choose how many votes to cast so as to maximize the expected
utility of the continuation game, given the strategies of the other players. Be-
cause the sign of each group’s preferences is common knowledge and intensities
are independent over time, voting decisions cannot be used to manipulate other
players’ beliefs about future preferences. Assuming, in addition, that players
do not use weakly dominated strategies, the direction of each individual vote
is always chosen sincerely: all the minority members’ votes are cast in favor of
each proposal (for α), and all majority votes are cast against each proposal (for
β). The state of the game at t is deﬁned to be the proﬁle of bonus votes each
voter has still available, Bt =( B1t,...B nt), and the number of remaining peri-
ods, T −t. We focus on strategies such that the number of votes each individual
chooses to cast each period, xit, depends only on the intensity of preferences
at time t, vit and on the state of the game at t. We denote such strategies by
xit(vi,B t,t). We will typically think of the initial stock of bonus votes B0 as
an integer number and of each bonus vote as equivalent in value to the regular
vote, but in general neither B0 nor the units in which it can be divided need to
be integers.4
When characterizing the equilibria of our model, the correlation of valuations
within each group in model C can be a source of complications. But matters can
be simpliﬁed by a simple observation. Consider the following 2-player storable
votes model, C2.V o t e r M has M regular votes each period and a stock of
MB0 bonus votes; his valuation over each proposal is MvMt where vMt is
independently drawn from the distribution function FM with support [−1,0].
Voter m has m regular votes each period and a stock of mB0 bonus votes; his
valuation over each proposal is mvmt where vmt is independently drawn from
the distribution function Fm with support [0,1]. Then the following result holds:
Lemma 1. If game C2 has an equilibrium, then the game described by model
C also has an equilibrium. In addition, call x∗
Mt(vi,B t,t) and x∗
mt(vi,B t,t) the
equilibrium strategies of voter M and voter m in game C2,a n d{x∗
it(vi,B t,t)}
4A" u n i t "o fB0 is the relative value of one bonus vote to one regular vote.
9the equilibrium strategies in C.I fC2 has an equilibrium, then there exist










The proof is in the Appendix, but the point is simply that in model C voters’
interests within each group are perfectly aligned. If there is an equilibrium where
each group coordinates its strategy so as to maximize the group’s payoﬀ,g i v e n
the aggregate strategy of the other group, then no individual voter can gain from
deviating.5 In the n-person game described by model C, we will call equilibrium
group strategies the equilibrium individual strategies of the 2-voter game C2.6
We can then borrow from previous results and state:
Lemma 2. Both model B and model C have an equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. In model B individual equilibrium strategies are monotone cutpoint strate-
gies; in model C, group strategies are monotone cutpoint strategies: at any state
(Bt,t) and for any i with ki = Bi +1available votes there exists a set of cut-
points {ci1(Bt,t),c i2(Bt,t),...,c ik(Bt,t)}, 0 ≤ cix ≤ cix+1 ≤ 1,s u c ht h a ti will
cast x votes if and only if vit ∈ [cix,c ix+1],w h e r ei ∈ {1,..,n} in model B and
i ∈ {M,m} in model C.
The Lemma follows almost immediately from the proofs in Casella (2005)
and Casella, Gelman and Palfrey (2005), with few modiﬁcations needed to take
into account the systematically opposite preferences of the two groups. The
details are in the Appendix.
The important point is that storable votes open the possibility of minority
victories. Because the outcome of a vote depends on the number of votes cast,
and this number is now potentially diﬀerent from the number of voters on ei-
ther side of an issue, a minority using some of its bonus votes occasionally can
outvote the majority. The diﬀerence with respect to standard majority rule is
particularly stark in the case of systematic minorities, as in our model, where
by deﬁnition the minority would always lose. Indeed we can show:
Theorem 1. For any F, M and m and T>M , there always exists B0
suﬃciently large such that in all equilibria of the storable votes mechanism the
minority is expected to win some of the time with strictly positive probability (in
both models B and C).
The proof is in the Appendix, but the intuition is transparent. To guarantee
itself victory all the time, the majority needs to spread the bonus votes at its
disposal over all proposals. If the horizon is suﬃciently long and the stock of
bonus votes suﬃciently large, at least one proposal must exist over which the
majority can be overruled with positive probability even by a single minority
voter concentrating his bonus votes. The exact valuation of the minority voter
over that one proposal is irrelevant, if the alternative is for the minority to lose
all the time, and thus the diﬀerence between models B and C here is immaterial.
5This is the logic exploited by McLennan (1998) to show that "sincere" voting must be a
Nash equilibrium in common value decision problems with information aggregation.
6Other equilibria are possible, where no individual voter can gain from deviating, although
the group’s (and thus each individual’s) payoﬀ could be increased by joint group deviation.
103.2 Eﬃciency
The possibility of minority victories is central to the idea of storable votes.
But in fact what matters is not such a possibility per se:i ti st h ef a c tt h a t
the mechanism induces the minority to win "when it should", from the point
of view of aggregate eﬃciency, i.e. when preferences are strongly felt by the
minority, and at the same time weakly felt by the majority. The tendency is
implied by the monotonicity of the equilibrium voting choices. Consider model
C. At any given state, the number of votes cast by each group increases with
the group’s intensity of preferences, and because the majority typically has
more available votes than the minority, it can overrule the minority. Thus, the
minority is expected to win when its intensity of preferences is high and the
intensity of preferences of the majority is low. The argument is complicated
by the dynamic nature of the game, the evolving budget constraint, and the
non-stationary strategies. Also, in case of model B the varying intensity of
preferences within each group complicates the game. It is possible, however, to
make it more precise.
As discussed earlier, our eﬃciency measure assigns equal weight to the ex
ante welfare of all voters, where voters form expectations about their total utility
from the T decisions ignoring their valuation on each of them, but knowing
whether they belong to the minority or the majority group. We call our eﬃciency
measure EV0 and contrast it with the equivalent measure under simple majority
voting, denoted by EW0.
The intuition described above applies to both models, but the properties of
the voting mechanism appear more robust, and easier to characterize, in model
C. The following theorem is proved in the Appendix:
Theorem 2. In model C,f o ra l lF and T, if m>2 and M<2m then
t h e r ee x i s t sav a l u eo f B0 and an equilibrium of the storable votes mechanism
such that storable votes are ex ante superior to simple majority voting (i.e.
EV0 >E W 0).
The theorem relies on the construction of a speciﬁc equilibrium where voting
strategies reﬂect intensities of preferences. In this equilibrium, the minority
occasionally wins, but only if it feels more strongly about the decision at hand
than the majority. If the minority is not too small, relative to the majority, ex
ante expected welfare must then be higher than with simple majority voting.
The constraints on B0 and on the absolute size of m ensure that the posited
strategies are an equilibrium for arbitrary F and T. The result can be shown
to hold for m =2and with less restrictive constraints on B0 if we limit F and
T,i np a r t i c u l a ri fF is Uniform and T =2 .
A similar intuition holds for model B, if the size of the minority is suﬃciently
large. However, the construction of the equilibrium is complicated by the lack
of correlation of individual values within each group. In the case of F Uniform,
we have been able to verify it numerically.
Indeed, given that both Theorems 1 and 2 rely on suﬃcient and rather re-
strictive conditions, analyzing the storable votes mechanism when F is Uniform,
11and in the particularly simple case where T =2can help to our intuition. For
this reason, and because the example will guide the parameter choices in our
experimental treatments we discuss it below in some detail.
3.3 An Example: Uniform Valuations and Two Periods
The following scenario is the basis of our experimental treatment. There are two
successive proposals (T =2 ); each voter is given two bonus votes, in addition
to his regular votes (B0 =2 ), and the total number n of voters is odd. The
distribution F(v) is Uniform: minority and majority members have valuations
of opposite sign, but, given the sign, each absolute valuation in the allowed
support is equally likely. The strategy chosen by each voter is the number of
votes to cast over the ﬁrst proposal, after having learned his valuation over that
proposal.
This example has simple equilibria. In model B there exists an equilibrium
where all voters, whether in the minority or in the majority, spend all bonus
votes over the ﬁrst proposal if the intensity of their preferences is higher than
the mean, and none otherwise: xi1 =1if vi1 < 0.5 and xi1 =3if vi1 > 0.5
for all i.I f M>3m, the majority always wins, but for all M ≤ 3m there












> 0 where k ≡ (M − m +1 ) /2.I n m o d e l C,i f
2M>3m, the majority can ensure itself victory every time; if 2M ≤ 3m
it cannot, and there exists an equilibrium in which the minority again wins
with positive probability. In this equilibrium, the minority cumulates all bonus
votes on the ﬁrst proposal if the intensity of preferences is higher than the
mean, and none otherwise; the majority follows the same strategy if M is large
enough, and splits some of its bonus votes otherwise: xm1 = m if vm1 < 0.5
and xm1 =3 m if vm1 > 0.5, while xM1 =m a x {M,m +3 } if vM1 < 0.5 and
xM1 =m i n {3M,4M −(m+3)} if vM1 > 0.5. The minority wins each proposal
with probability 0.25.7
The equilibria and their welfare properties are analyzed in detail in the
Appendix. They capture our intuitive understanding of storable votes, and in
particular of the implied probability of minority victories. Figure 1 illustrates
the main features of equilibrium.
The ﬁgure is drawn for the speciﬁcc a s eM = m +1 , but its qualitative
features hold generally and can easily be interpolated to the generic case M =
m+k with k odd. Figure 1a shows, for both models, the probability of a minority
victory over either of the two proposals in equilibrium - the black dots - and the
outcome according to our benchmark eﬃcient criterion (when each decision is
solved in favor of the side with highest total valuation) - the grey dots. As the
absolute size of the minority increases, so does its size relative to the majority.
7Both models have multiple equilibria. In model B for any n odd there is an equilibrium
where every voters casts 2 votes each period and the majority always wins. In model C,t h e
equilibrium described in the text can be supported for all 3m − 2 >M(even if 2M>3m).
However, in both cases these additional equilibria rely on weakly dominated strategies. We
ignore them in the ﬁgures below.
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Figure 1a. Frequency of minority victories 
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Figure 1b. Expected payoff for majority and minority members (per capita). 
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Figure 1c. Expected aggregate payoff as share of the available surplus 
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The large black dots plot equilibrium payoffs with storable votes; the grey dots efficient payoffs, and 
the small black dots payoffs with simple majority voting.      
 Not surprisingly, in both models this results in an increase in the probability of
minority victories. In model B, the equilibrium probability increases smoothly,
eventually converging to 0.5 as the number of voters becomes large and the
absolute diﬀerence negligible. The eﬃcient frequency of minority victories is
slightly higher than the equilibrium frequency, but the diﬀerence disappears as
both converge to 0.5.I n m o d e l C, the change in the equilibrium probability
of minority victories is discontinuous, jumping from 0 to 0.25 as the majority
becomes unable to overrule the minority over both proposals, and remaining
constant at that level. The minority size at which the jump occurs depends
on the absolute diﬀerence between the two groups. The eﬃcient frequency
of minority victories on the other hand increases smoothly with the relative
size of the minority and is always higher than the equilibrium frequency, again
converging to 0.5 as the diﬀerence between the size of the two groups becomes
negligible.
Figure 1b plots the expected per capita payoﬀ for majority and minority
members. With simple majority rule, the respective values are 1 and 0 in
both models. With storable votes, the expected payoﬀs of the two groups are
closer to each other, unless the majority can ensure itself victory, although
the minority’s payoﬀ remains lower than under eﬃciency (light grey dots in
Figure 1b,) eventually converging to eﬃciency as the number of voters increases
in model B but not in model C.I n m o d e l C, equilibrium per capita payoﬀs
remain constant for each group, regardless of m, once the threshold where the
majority always wins has been passed.8 The speciﬁc values depend on the shape
of the distribution F(v). Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to conclude that
storable votes are a more valuable mechanism in model B than in model C.
Figure 1c plots a normalized measure of expected surplus for both models
and for both storable votes and simple majority voting. We calculate expected
aggregate payoﬀ as share of the available surplus, deﬁned as expected payoﬀ
in the ex post eﬃcient mechanism (i.e. where each vote is decided in favor of
the group with higher total values). As a plausible lower bound on eﬃciency,
we normalize both numerator and denominator by the expected payoﬀ in the
random mechanism, i.e. when each proposal is equally likely to pass or to
fail. Thus if we call EV ∗ the expected ex-post eﬃcient aggregate payoﬀ and
R the expected payoﬀ under the random mechanism, we deﬁne the normalized
aggregate surplus as (EV − R)/(EV ∗ − R) with storable votes and (EW −
R)/(EV ∗ − R) with simple majority. Over the two proposals, EW = M and
R =( M+m)/2 in both models, while EV and EV ∗ are derived in the Appendix.
As the ﬁgure shows, when the number of voters is small and the diﬀerence in size
between the two groups relatively important, the possibility of minority victories
in the storable votes mechanism is accompanied by some loss of eﬃciency in
model B,b u tn o ti nm o d e lC,w h e r ee ﬃciency is always at least as high as under
simple majority rule. The loss in model B is not large and disappears rapidly
a st h en u m b e ro fv o t e r sa n dt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h em i n o r i t yi n c r e a s e s . F o r
8In fact, they remain unchanged for any absolute diﬀerence between the two groups, once
the threshold 3m<2M has been passed. It is the threshold itself that depends on (M − m).
13most sizes of the electorate, storable votes allow voters to appropriate a larger
share of the total surplus in both models. The main diﬀerence between the two
models emerges in the limit. In model B, the valuation draws are independent,
hence, as the population becomes very large the law of large numbers guarantees
that the empirical average intensity of preferences in both groups converges to
the mean of the F(v) distribution. This means that random choice, simple
majority voting and storable votes all converge to ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃciency and any
eﬃciency-based argument for protecting the minority disappears. In model C,
on the other hand, the valuation draws within each group are not independent
(in our model they are perfectly correlated), and the law of large numbers does
not apply. As the number of voters increases, the diﬀerence in size between the
two groups becomes negligible and simple majority voting again converges to
random choice, but random choice remains inferior to eﬃcient decision-making
and to storable votes. Referring back to Figure 1c, in model B the storable votes
equilibrium (larger dots curve) converges to the eﬃcient outcome (smaller dots
curve) and both converge to zero in the limit. 9 In model C, the smaller dots
curve again converges to zero, but the larger dots curve converges to 3/8.10 One
can conclude from this analysis that in very large populations, only minorities
whose intensities are correlated should be protected on eﬃciency grounds.
4 Experimental design
Models B and C
All sessions of the experiment were run either at the Hacker SSEL laboratory
at Caltech, the CASSEL laboratory at UCLA, or the PLESS laboratory at
Princeton with enrolled students who were recruited from the whole campus
through the laboratory web sites. No subject participated in more than one
session. All sessions focussed on the example described above: subjects voted on
two consecutive proposals (T =2 ) and were allocated 2 bonus votes (B0 =2 ), in
addition to the regular vote they were required to cast over each proposal. With
the exception of one session, committees were composed of 5 voters, divided into
two groups of 3 and 2 voters with systematically opposed preferences.11 The
experiment’s main treatment variable was the correlation of intensities within
each group - the distinction between model B and model C.
After entering the computer laboratory, the subjects were seated randomly in
booths separated by partitions and assigned ID numbers corresponding to their
computer terminal; when everyone was seated, the experimenter read aloud
the instructions, and any questions were answered publicly. The session then
9This convergence is not apparent from the ﬁgure, but as m gets large enough the two
curves approach zero.
10In model C, a large electorate makes the ﬁnite diﬀerence between the two groups negligible,
but the statistical properties of the two valuation draws are unaﬀected. With two consecutive
proposals, expected per capita payoﬀsa r e :1/2 with simple majority voting or with random
choice; 2/3 under ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃciency; and 9/16 with storable votes. The results follow.
11As discussed below, we ran one session with committees of 9 voters, each divided into two
opposite groups of sizes 5 and 4.
14began.12 Subjects were matched randomly into committees and within each
committee were assigned randomly to the majority or the minority group. Each
subject was then shown his valuation for the ﬁrst proposal and asked to choose
how many votes to cast in the ﬁrst election. Valuations were restricted to
integer values and were drawn by the computer, with equal probability, from
the support [−100,−1] for majority members, and from [1,100] for minority
members. In both treatments, the valuations were drawn independently for
majority and minority members.
In treatment B each member of each group was assigned a valuation drawn
independently from the speciﬁed support; in treatment C all members of the
same group in the same committee were assigned the same valuation (i.e. all
majority members in a given committee shared the same valuation, as did all
minority members in a committee). The independence of the valuations within
each group in treatment B and their perfect correlation in treatment C were
common knowledge. After everyone in a committee had voted, the computer
screen showed to each subject the number of votes cast by each of the two
groups in the subject’s committee, whether the proposal has passed or not, and
the subject’s own payoﬀ from that election. Valuations over the second proposal
were then drawn, the remaining votes were automatically cast and the outcome
determined.
After the second proposal had been voted upon, subjects were rematched,
each was assigned a new budget of bonus votes and the game was replayed.
Experimental sessions consisted of either 20 or 30 such rounds13, each round a
sequence of two consecutive proposals. In the rematching, minority members
always remained minority members and majority members always remained
majority members, but the composition of each group and of each committee
was randomly determined. Subjects were paid privately at the end of each
session their cumulative valuations for all proposals resolved in their preferred
direction, multiplied by a pre-determined exchange rate. Average earnings were
about $17 per experiment for minority subjects and about $31 for majority
subjects.
The only choice given our experimental subjects was the number of votes to
cast over the ﬁrst proposal. With the parameter values used in the experiment,
individual equilibrium strategies in treatment B are not diﬃcult to identify, and
are reported in Table 1. There are two Perfect Bayesian equilibria. In the ﬁrst
one, every voter uses no bonus votes if his absolute valuation is smaller than
50 and all bonus votes if it is above - this is the equilibrium discussed in the
example of the previous section. If the two opposed groups are of size {3,2},
the minority is expected to win 19 percent of the time; if they are of size {5,4},
the minority is larger and is expected to win more often, 25 percent of the
time. These ﬁgures are reported in row 3 of Table 1. In the second equilibrium,
12A sample of the instructions from one of the sessions is reproduced in the Ap-
pendix. We used the Multistage Game software package developed jointly between
the SSEL and CASSEL labs. This open-source software can be downloaded from
http://research.cassel.ucla.edu/software.htm
13With the exception of one session of 15 rounds.
15every subject always uses 1 bonus vote, the equilibrium is identical to simple
majority voting and the majority always wins.14 Because minority members
use weakly dominated strategies and because the equilibrium exactly replicates
simple majority voting, we mention it here but will not discuss it further. We
focus instead on the ﬁrst equilibrium.
The equilibrium cutpoints - the threshold (absolute) values where individual
voters switch from casting 0 to casting 1 bonus vote, and from casting 1 to
casting 2 - are reported in row 2 of Table 1 and are denoted c1 and c2.15 Rows
3 and 4 in the table report the expected frequency of minority victories in
equilibrium and under ex post eﬃciency, respectively. Rows 5 and 6 report the
expected share of per capita payoﬀ for a minority voter, relative to a majority
voter, again in equilibrium and under ex post eﬃciency. So, for example, in
the {3,2} experiment with storable votes a minority subject the minority is
expected to win on average 26% of what a majority subject earns, if everybody
plays the equilibrium strategy. Finally, the last two rows report the expected
share of normalized aggregate surplus appropriated with storable votes (row 7)
and with simple majority voting (row 8).16
Table 1: Equilibrium strategies and outcomes.
B Treatment
M, m 3, 2 5, 4
c1, c2 50, 50 50, 50
% min wins, sv 19 25
% min wins, eﬀ 22.5 28.5
% (min/maj) payoﬀ,s v 26 36
% (min/maj) payoﬀ,e ﬀ 35.5 45
% surplus sv 71 61
% surplus nsv 75 62
The qualitative features of these numbers were discussed in the previous
section. Notice, once again, that although storable votes here are less eﬃcient,
from an aggregate point of view, than simple majority voting, the eﬃciency
loss is minor, relative to the dramatic eﬀect of storable votes on the welfare of
minorities.
Equilibrium strategies in treatment C pose some interesting problems. Equi-
librium group strategies are not diﬃcult to characterize, and one such equilib-
rium is the following. If the two groups are of size {3,2}, in equilibrium the
minority uses no bonus votes if its absolute valuation is smaller than 50 and
all its bonus votes if it is above - this is the strategy described in the previous
section. The majority casts 0, 1,o r2 bonus votes with probabilities p0, p1,
14As remarked in footnote 5, this equilibrium exists for all n odd, if T =2 .
15Because the equilibrium cutpoints are identical for minority and majority voters, we use
the symbols c1 and c2 for both groups.
16As described earlier, the share of available surplus is calculated scaling both expected
equilibrium payoﬀ and expected eﬃcient payoﬀ by the expected payoﬀ with random decision-
making.
16p2 if its absolute valuation is smaller than 50,a n d4, 5,o r6 bonus votes with
probabilities q0, q1, q2 if its absolute valuation is larger than 50,w h e r ep2 ≥
q2 and p1 = q1 - a strategy that encompasses the one described earlier (with
p0 = p1 =0 ,a n dq1 = q2 =0 ).
Any individual strategy compatible with these group strategies is an equi-
librium. Hence, each minority voter has a simple symmetrical strategy that
aggregates to the equilibrium group strategy: vote 1 if the valuation is below
50 and 3 if the valuation is 50 or above. But the aggregation problem for ma-
jority voters is more diﬃcult. The group strategy described above cannot be
supported by symmetric individual strategies, and coordination on asymmetric
strategies is hampered by the random rematching in our experimental design. In
fact, for our experimental environment, not only is there no symmetric individ-
ual strategy that aggregates to the group strategy we have described, but there
is no asymmetric strategy that each majority voter can adopt consistently and
that would always aggregate to the equilibrium group strategy, for any possible
rematching.
We know that a symmetrical equilibrium exists (by standard ﬁxed point ar-
guments)17, but we have not been able to characterize it, and we doubt that our
experimental subjects, confronted with a new game and under time pressure,
would be much more successful. In practice, our basic C treatment is then a test
of the robustness of storable votes’ outcomes to strategic mistakes. In previous
work (Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey, forthcoming), we found that the eﬃciency
properties of storable votes were preserved in experiments in which individual
strategies deviated from equilibrium but remained monotonic. The experiments
conducted then did not feature systematic minorities, and equilibrium strate-
gies in fact were simpler to calculate and implement than in the present case.
With more complex equilibrium strategies, reevaluating the robustness of the
mechanism seems particularly important.
To this end, we designed two additional treatments, as controls for our basic
C case. In these treatments, the majority’s coordination problems should disap-
pear. A comparison of the behavior of the majority across the three treatments
and of the experimental outcomes will give us information about the importance
of coordination.
4.1 Additional treatments
In these two additional treatments, we focused on groups of size {3,2}.I nt r e a t -
ment C2 ("correlated valuations, coordinated voting") a single subject repre-
sented the whole group. Half of the experimental subjects were randomly as-
signed to represent majority groups, and half minority groups. Each majority
group’s representative had 3 indivisible regular votes to cast on each of the two
proposals and 6 bonus votes to cast as desired. Each minority group’s represen-
tative had 2 indivisible regular votes to spend on each of the two proposals and 4
bonus votes. A committee was then formed by one pair of experimental subjects,
17Taking into account that the set of types is ﬁnite in our experimental treatment.
17one subject randomly drawn from all those representing a minority group, and
the other from all those representing a majority group. In each committee, and
for each proposal, valuations were drawn independently with equal probability,
from the support [−100,−1] for the majority representative, and from [1,100]
for the minority one. The timing of the game proceeded as described earlier.
After each two-proposal round, partners were rematched, but all minority repre-
sentatives remained minority representatives for the whole experimental session,
as did all majority representatives. When we discuss experimental payoﬀsf r o m
this treatment, we multiply the minority representative’s payoﬀ by 2 and the
majority’s by 3, so as to make them comparable to the theoretical predictions
and to the experimental payoﬀsf o rt h eC case and to the following treatment,
which we call CChat.
In treatment CChat ("correlated valuations, chat option") we replicated the
C treatment, with each group composed of multiple individual subjects, adding
a "chat option". Before the vote on the ﬁrst proposal, each group member is
allowed to send messages via computer to other members of his own group. Sub-
jects are instructed not to identify themselves, and the messages are anonymous
but otherwise unconstrained. In particular, they allow subjects to coordinate
on their preferred group strategy. Everything else in the experiment - the sto-
chastic properties of the valuation draws, the timing, the random re-matching
- follows exactly the C treatment.
Equilibrium group strategies and expected outcomes are identical in the
three C treatments - C, C2,a n dCChat. They are reported in Table 2. In
equilibrium, the minority votes either 2 or 6,a n dgL and gH in the table
denote the cutpoints where the minority switches from casting 0 bonus votes
to casting 2,a n df r o mc a s t i n g2 to casting 4. Similarly GL and GH denote
the cutpoints where the majority switches between randomizing over 0,1,a n d
2 bonus votes and randomizing over 4, 5,a n d6 bonus votes. Without adding
it to the table, recall that the majority strategy is an equilibrium only if the
probabilities employed in the randomization satisfy p2 ≥ q2 and p1 = q1.
Table 2: Equilibrium group strategies and outcomes.
C Treatments
M, m 3, 2
gL, gH 50, 50
GL, GH 50, 50
% min wins, sv 25
% min wins, eﬀ 33
% (min/maj) payoﬀ,s v 38.5
% (min/maj) payoﬀ,e ﬀ 52
% surplus sv 60
% surplus nsv 53
As discussed in the previous section, the outcome is more favorable to the
minority in model C than in model B, both in terms of the expected frequency
18of minority victories and of its expected payoﬀ, relative to the majority. Notice
also that storable votes outperform simple majority voting in this case.
The experimental design is summarized in Table 3. In all experiments the
majority was formed by 3 subjects and the minority by 2, with the exception of
session b3 where the number of subjects in each group was 5 and 4 respectively.
Session b3 serves us as a control on the sensitivity of the experimental results
to the size of the groups.
Table 3: Experimental Design
Session Groups size Subject pool # Subjects Rounds
b13 , 2 C I T 1 5 3 0
b23 , 2 U C L A 2 0 3 0
b35 , 4 U C L A 2 7 3 0
c13 , 2 U C L A1 5 3 0
c23 , 2 P U 1 5 2 0
c33 , 2 P U 1 0 2 0
c213 , 2 C I T 1 2 3 0
c223 , 2 U C L A 1 6 3 0
c233 , 2 P U 1 2 2 0
cchat13 , 2 P U 1 0 2 0
cchat23 , 2 P U 1 5 1 5
5 Experimental Results
We begin describing our experimental results by focusing on the outcomes. Later
we analyze the subjects’ behavior. The main results echo closely the conclu-
sions of our previous set of storable votes experiments (Casella, Gelman and
Palfrey, forthcoming): the experimental outcomes are closer to the theory than
the strategies are. In the current setting, the implication is that storable votes
do indeed favor minorities, and do so either with a small loss of eﬃciency (if
the strength of preferences within each group is uncorrelated) or, in fact, with
an improvement in aggregate eﬃciency (if members of each group share not
only the direction but also the strength of their preferences). More than that,
storable votes appear once again as a rather robust mechanism: as long as
voting choices remain monotonic in the strength of preferences, behavior most
experimental subjects appear to ﬁnd natural, systematic deviations from the
equilibrium strategies do not impair either the possibility of minority victories
nor the eﬃciency of the mechanism.
195.1 Outcomes and Eﬃciency
5.1.1 How often did the minority groups win?
The diagram on the left of Figure 2a summarizes the answer to this question.
The vertical axis is the percentage of times the minority prevailed in the exper-
imental sessions, and the horizontal axis is the percentages of times it would
have prevailed if all subjects had played the equilibrium strategy, given the val-
uations drawn during the experiments. Diﬀerent treatments are indicated by
diﬀerent symbols, as described in the ﬁgure’s legend.
The ﬁgure can then be read in several ways. The vertical height tells us that
the minority won between 20 and 25 percent of the time in C, C2,a n dCChat,
with little dispersion among them; it won less frequently in the B sessions
(around 15 percent of the time) with the exception of the one experiment of size
{5,4}where the minority won about 23 percent of the time.
In all treatments, the eﬀect of storable votes in increasing the represen-
tation of the minority was not marginal. Qualitatively, the diﬀerence across
treatments matches the theoretical predictions, as is evident from the way the
points align along the 45-degree line. The closer to the line a point is, the closer
the experiment’s results are to the equilibrium predictions. If we estimate a
simple regression line, the hypotheses of a unitary slope parameter and a zero
constant term cannot be rejected at standard conﬁdence values.18 On average,
the frequency of minority victories in the experiments diﬀers from the equilib-
rium predictions by 3 percentage points, without clear outliers19 and without
systematic treatment eﬀects. This last remark reﬂects the fact that the exper-
imental results support the qualitative comparative statics predictions of the
model across treatments. We ﬁnd this surprising because the complexity of the
individual equilibrium strategies in the basic C treatment (as opposed to C2
and CChat) would suggest a larger discrepancy from equilibrium predictions in
that speciﬁc treatment, a discrepancy the data do not show.
5.1.2 Did the experimental payoﬀ to the minority match the theo-
retical predictions?
Storable votes did indeed result in minority victories in the experiments. But
did minorities win when their valuations tended to be high - in other words,
did minorities’ payoﬀs match the theory? The diagram on the right of ﬁgure 2a
plots per capita minority payoﬀ as percentage of per capita majority payoﬀ in
the experiments on the vertical axis, and in equilibrium on the horizontal axis,
using the symbols of the previous ﬁgure to identify the diﬀerent experimental
sessions. In all C, C2 and Cchat treatments the relative minority payoﬀ was
higher than in any B treatments, as predicted by the theory, ranging between 33
and 45 percent of the average majority payoﬀ,v e r s u s16 to 20 percent in the B
treatments of size {3,2} and 30 percent in the B treatment of size {5,4}. Again,
18The estimated parameters are: 0.76 for the slope (with a standard error of 0.23), and 3.4
for the constant term (with a standard error of 5.8).
19Both mean and median distance are 3 percentage points.
20FIGURE 2  
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 the eﬀect of the voting mechanism in raising the minority’s payoﬀ was signiﬁ-
cant. Out of eleven experimental sessions, all but two are below the 45-degree
line, suggesting that the minority was unable to fully exploit the opportunity
presented by the voting mechanism. But the discrepancy is not large - the
average distance from the 45-degree line is 5 percentage points, again without
clear outliers20 or treatment eﬀects, a number that is small in comparison to
the diﬀerences across treatments. Again, if we estimate a regression line, we
cannot reject the hypotheses of unitary slope and zero constant.21
5 . 1 . 3 A tw h a tc o s tt ot h em a j o r i t yw e r et h em i n o r i t y ’ sg a i n s ? A t
what cost to overall eﬃciency?
In our experiments storable votes did indeed favor minorities - the majority lost
with some frequency. If the majority’s losses are large, relative to the minority’s
gains, the advantage of storable votes in terms of equity becomes questionable.
The theory suggests that this should not occur, but was the prediction conﬁrmed
in the experiments? The left-hand side of ﬁgure 2b plots the normalized total
surplus in each session (recall that this is the share of the available surplus
above what the random mechanism earns) on the vertical axis, against the
equilibrium predictions on the horizontal axis. The equilibrium predictions are
calculated on the basis of each session’s experimental draws. Points on the 45
degree line indicate that storable votes capture the amount of surplus predicted
by the theory. The mean distance from the 45 degree line is 7 percentage
points, again with little evidence of outliers (the median is 6.5)v e r s u sam e a n
equilibrium surplus share of 60 percent. As in the previous ﬁgures, we cannot
reject a regression line with unitary slope and zero constant, although the ﬁti s
poorer.22
Thus, the answer to our question is that the cost to the majority is roughly
as theory had predicted: the minority tends to win when the majority has lower
preference intensity. While the match of the data to the theory is not as tight as
in Casella, Gelman and Palfrey (forthcoming), the game is substantially more
complex. Note that two of the three largest discrepancies from equilibrium
correspond to C2 treatments (the third is a C session), a puzzling result, given
that coordination is built into the C2 design, and one to which we will return
later.
From a practical point of view, the central question is how the eﬃciency of
storable votes compares to the eﬃciency of alternative voting systems - in our
case against simple majority voting. In the diagram on the right of ﬁgure 2b,
the vertical axis is again the normalized total surplus in each session, now plot-
20Both mean and median distance are 5.2 percentage points. Note that a plausible range
of values in Figure 2b is between 0 (the outcome with simple majority voting) and 100 (the
expected outcome with random decision-making). In ﬁgure 2a, the corresponding range is
between 0 and 50.
21The estimated parameters are: 1.03 for the slope (with a standard error of 0.19), and
−6.2 for the constant term (with a standard error of 7.1).
22The estimated parameters are: 0.7 for the slope (with a standard error of 0.40), and 14.1
for the constant term (with a standard error of 24.1).
21ted against the equivalent measure with simple majority voting calculated from
the experimental valuation draws. The theory predicts that data points repre-
senting C, C2 and CChat sessions should lie above the 45-degree line, while B
experiments should lie below, with the {5,4} B experiment only slightly below.
The prediction is conﬁrmed by the C and by the B experiments. Surprisingly
it is the "easier" treatments with coordination, C2 and Cchat, that fall short
of the prediction. Once again, two of the three most signiﬁcant losses relative
to non-storable votes occur in C2 sessions. Taking all C, C2 and CChat treat-
ments together, the mean diﬀerence in normalized surplus was an improvement
of 2 percentage points, versus a theoretical prediction of 7.I f w e t a k e a l l B
treatments together, given the small number of experiments, the mean diﬀer-
ence was a loss just below 10 percentage points, versus a theoretical prediction
of 4 ( t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h ed i ﬀerence in group sizes).
The picture emerging from these data can be summarized in two main points.
First, in our experiments storable votes did indeed help minorities. They helped
minorities substantially, both in terms of the frequency with which minorities
w o nd e c i s i o n sa n di nt e r m so ft h ep a y o ﬀsi n v o l v e di nt h e s ed e c i s i o n s .B yd e ﬁ-
nition, minorities could not have done worse than with simple majority voting,
but the outcomes suggest that the improvement was signiﬁcant. In particular,
the experimental results matched the theoretical predictions in terms of dif-
ferences across treatments: correlation in the strength of preferences helps the
minority gain a larger weight in decision-making and larger returns. Second, the
eﬃciency costs associated with the increased representation of minority inter-
ests were somewhat larger than the theory predicted, but changed consistently
across the diﬀerent treatments. In particular, when the strength of preferences
was not correlated within each group, storable votes induced (small) aggregate
welfare losses, as predicted. But when the strength of preferences was perfectly
correlated within the group, on average storable votes led to welfare gains over
simple majority voting.
Over all experimental outcomes discussed so far, there was some evidence of
learning - some improvement in the ﬁt of the data to the theory - in the later
rounds, but the evidence remained mostly weak and the substantive features of
our results unchanged.
5.2 Behavior
We begin by studying the behavior of the experimental subjects in the treat-
ments that did not allow group members to coordinate their strategies (B and
C). We thus focus naturally on individual behavior. Later we turn to group
behavior and discuss the role played by explicit coordination (treatments C2
and CChat).
5.2.1 Individual behavior
Storable votes are designed to allow voters to express the intensity of their
preferences. But this can only occur if voters cast more votes, at any given state,
22when their preferences are stronger. The monotonicity of voting strategies is at
the core of the mechanism, and it is natural to analyze subject behavior in our
experiments by studying this property ﬁrst. In our experiments, we can measure
monotonicity easily because there are only two periods. The meaningful decision
is the number of votes cast in the ﬁrst period, when everybody has all bonus
votes still available, and the state is simply (B01,..,B0n,t=1 )=( 2 ,..,2,t=1 ) .
With more than two periods, testing monotonicity is more diﬃcult because the
state then depends on the entire history of previous votes. Each state is then
reached only rarely, inducing small sample problems.
To obtain a measure of monotonicity of individual behavior, we estimate
monotonicity violations and cutpoints for each subject. For each subject we
have K pairs of observations (where K equals either 20 or 30 depending on the
session23), where each pair consists of a ﬁrst proposal value and the number of
votes cast for (or against) the ﬁrst proposal. The number of votes cast is always
1, 2,o r3. A perfectly monotone strategy is one for which we can ﬁnd two
cutpoints, c1 ≤ c2 such that whenever the subject’s ﬁrst period valuation was
below c1 the subject cast 1 vote, whenever the subject’s ﬁrst period valuation
was above c2,t h es u b j e c tc a s t3 votes, and for intermediate values between c1
and c2 the subject cast 2 votes. We calculate the number of monotonicity viola-
tions as the minimum number of voting choices that would have to be changed,
for each subject, to make the strategy perfectly, if possibly weakly, monotonic.
We then identify the pair of cutpoints that is consistent with such monotonic
strategy. Because there are gaps in the valuations drawn, typically multiple
cutpoints are consistent with the same number of monotonicity violations; and
because our null hypothesis is equilibrium behavior, we select the pair that is
closest to the equilibrium cutpoints.
Figure 3a presents histograms of individual monotonicity violations in treat-
ments B and C. The horizontal axis is divided into deciles representing the
percentage of violations over the total number of voting decisions, and the ver-
tical axis reports the fraction of subjects that belong to each decile.
In the B treatment, 50 percent of the subjects have 3 or fewer violations
out of 30 voting decisions (10 percent). In the C treatment, 57 percent of
subjects had violation rates less than or equal to 10 percent.24 As comparison,
a voter choosing randomly whether to cast 0, 1,o r2 bonus votes would have a
violation rate converging to 2/3 as the number of decisions becomes very large.
To account for the smaller number of violations that would result from the small
sample and the free cutpoints, we have simulated such random behavior with
21 subjects and 30 rounds. We found that no subjects had violation rates less
or equal to 30 percent.25 The comparison makes clear that, although noisy,
individual choices indeed tend to be monotonic for most subjects.
The estimated cutpoints for all individual subjects in the B and C sessions
are displayed in ﬁgures 3b. Each point represents one subject’s estimated pair
23With the exception of session cchat2, with 15 rounds.
24Recall that only voting choices over the ﬁrst proposal are relevant (all remaining votes
are cast over the second proposal).
25Precisely: 2 subjects at the fourth decile, 8 at the ﬁfth, and 11 at the sixth.
23FIGURE 3 
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 of cutpoints, with c1 on the horizontal axis and c2 on the vertical axis. All
cutpoints lying on the 45 degree line involve no splitting of bonus votes: casting
either both or neither of the bonus votes over the ﬁrst decision. Moving to
t h eu p p e rl e f tc o r n e ro ft h eg r a p ha r ec u t p o i n t st h a ti n v o l v em o r ea n dm o r e
splitting of bonus votes, i.e. using one bonus vote in each period for a range
of values that increases as one approaches the corner. The upper left corner of
the graph, at (0,100) corresponds to always casting one bonus vote. Cutpoints
for subjects in the minority group are in the left graph and cutpoints for the
subjects in the majority group are in the right graph. The rates of monotonicity
violations are indicated by shading the points. The darkest points have rates
of violations below 10 percent, the next darkest are the next decile, and the
lightest cutpoints have more the 20 percent violation rates.
In the B treatments, the equilibrium cutpoints for both majority and minor-
ity subjects are (50,50): if everyone played the equilibrium strategies all points
w o u l db eo nt h e4 5d e g r e el i n ea t50.I nt h eC treatments, (50,50) remains an
equilibrium for individual minority subjects, but not for subjects in the major-
ity, whose asymmetrical strategies are contingent on the behavior of the other
members of the group and cannot be identiﬁed unambiguously in the ﬁgure.
Two features of the distribution of cutpoints are noticeable in both treat-
ments. First, the minority cutpoints do cluster around (50,50), and on average
minority subjects whose cutpoints are closer to equilibrium have lower violation
rates. Second, bonus votes are much more frequently split by majority voters,
and their cutpoints are more scattered. Intuitively, majority voters have less to
lose from splitting their bonus votes - their larger number implies that they are
guaranteed to always win one of the two decisions, and one single vote more
or less plays a smaller role than in the case of the minority. We can make the
intuition more precise. Consider the parameter values used in the experiments
and a committee of size (3,2).I nm o d e lB, a minority voter who always split his
bonus votes should expect a loss just below 15 percent, versus an expected loss
just below 4 percent for a majority voter (relative to the expected equilibrium
payoﬀ)26.I nm o d e lC, the losses from individual deviation depend on the spe-
ciﬁc mixture used by the majority, with the maximum loss reaching 50 percent
for a minority voter, and 8 percent for a majority voter.27 The diﬀerence in
the cost of splitting one’s bonus votes in the two models may play some role in
the more pronounced clustering of the minority cutpoints around the 45 degree
line, and particularly around (50,50) in the C treatment, although there is no
visible eﬀect for the majority.
26Supposing that all other voters play the equilibrium strategy.
27The loss to a minority voter always splitting his bonus votes is maximal when the ma-
jority’s strategy is to cast 5 votes for values below 50,a n d7 votes for values above. For a
majority voter, it is maximal when his deviation moves the majority group’s strategy from 5
votes for values below 50,a n d7 votes for values above, to 6 votes always.
245.2.2 Group behavior
From the perspective of the welfare properties of the mechanism, the monotonic-
ity of the individual strategies provides only a partial picture. Eﬃciency de-
mands that group strategies be monotonic in the group value. In the B treat-
ment the notion of "group value" is ill deﬁned because diﬀerent subjects within
a group have diﬀerent values. But we can check for "group monotonicity" in the
C treatment, that is, we can check whether the sum of the votes by members of
one group is monotone in their (common) value. If there is heterogeneity in be-
havior, monotonicity at the individual level need not imply monotonicity at the
group level because individuals are continuously rematched. But the problem is
particularly severe for the majority whose individual equilibrium strategies are
asymmetric.28
The histograms in the ﬁrst row of Figure 4a illustrate the diﬃculty that
groups had in the C treatment. More than 40 percent of the groups had error
rates above 20 percent, compared to only 10 percent of individual subjects in
the same experimental sessions (see Figure 3a). As expected, and as shown by
the histogram on the right, most errors are associated with the majority, where
more than 60 percent of the groups had more than 20 percent error rates.
A comparison of these results to monotonicity violations in the C2 and
CChat treatments allows us to study the role of explicit coordination. Accord-
ing to the histograms in the second row of Figure 4, communication, as designed
in CChat, did reasonably well in reducing group violations: all minority groups
and 2 out of 5 of the majority groups had fewer than 10 percent violations. More
surprising is the poor performance of the C2 treatment, where perfect coordi-
nation is imposed by the experimental design, although such poor performance
is due in large part to one single experimental session: session c22 conducted at
UCLA (where 25 percent of the subjects had a rate of violations approaching
50 percent).29
These results leave us with a puzzle: if the aggregate group behavior of the
experimental subjects in sessions C often violates monotonicity, why did the
outcomes of these experiments - in terms of minority victories and eﬃciency -
still conform to the theory? Why did these sessions outperform, on average,
the C2 sessions with apparently comparable record of monotonicity violations.
The answer comes from the underlying monotonicity of the individual behavior
in treatment C. Intuitively, because individual subjects did cast their vote
monotonically, the violations resulting from the uncoordinated aggregation of
the votes are numerous, but are not large: they tend to be concentrated around
the cutpoints values. We can make this statement more precise. The histograms
in ﬁgure 4b summarize the distribution of the average distance of "mistaken"
28We identify a group by the label in the experiment (group 1, group 2, etc.), but rematching
implies that the composition of each group continues to change. Note that if equilibrium
strategies were symmetrical, the changing composition of the group would not matter.
29In both the C2 and CChat treatments, monotonicity violations for the majority are
calculated relative to the three strategies that are payoﬀ-equivalent: low (i.e.either 3, 4 or 5),
6 and high (either 7, 8 or 9). So for example, casting alternatively 3, 4 or 5 votes does not
result in monotonicity violations.
25FIGURE 4 
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Figure 4b: Average errors’ distance relative to random voting 
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 (i.e. non-monotonic) voting choices from the cutpoints, as percentage of the
expected distance if voting choices were random.30 The CChat experiments
behave best: with the exception of a single outlier, all other groups have error
distances below 20 percent of the random case. But it is the comparison between
the C and the C2 treatments that is particularly revealing in explaining the
diﬀerences in experimental outcomes: one fourth of all C2 groups have error
distances that are closer to the purely random case than any of the C groups.
As mentioned, this reﬂects mostly one outlier session, c22, and how much of
an outlier c22 is is made clear in the diagram on the right, in the bottom row
of ﬁgure 4b. Almost half of all groups in this session have error distances that
are closer to the purely random case than any of the C groups, and less than
one ﬁfth have distances that are less than 10 percent of the random case, a
very diﬀerent result from the other two C2 sessions. This is the reason why in
ﬁgure 2b the aggregate experimental payoﬀ of session c22 falls short both of
the theoretical prediction and of the payoﬀ with simple majority. The other C2
sessions are much better behaved, although they too present a few instances of
almost random behavior, something we do not observe in the C sessions. As
shown in ﬁgure 2b, in our relatively small experiments, these few cases were
suﬃcient to exact a cost in terms of eﬃciency, lowering the overall performance
of the C2 treatment. Why the treatment proved diﬃcult to our subjects is an
open question, although we can speculate that the problem may come from the
larger size of the individual strategy space: each minority voter had 5 diﬀerent
choices of how many votes (2,3,4,5,6)t ou s ei nt h eﬁrst period, and each
majority voter had 7 diﬀerent choices (3,4,5,6,7,8,9).
Our monotonicity analysis generates corresponding cutpoints estimates.31
Group cutpoints are depicted in Figure 5, with minority cutpoints on the left
and majority cutpoints on the right. In line with the equilibrium predictions, we
can summarize the strategies of each group through two cutpoints, represented
by a point in the diagrams. For the minority, the cutpoints are gl (horizontal
axis) and gh (vertical axis). For the minority group cutpoints, below gl no bonus
votes are cast by anyone in the group (i.e., the group votes 2), and above gh all
bonus votes are cast (the group votes 6). In equilibrium, gl and gh are (50,50).
For the majority, the cutpoints are Gl and Gh, such that below Gl the group
votes 3, 4,o r5,a n da b o v eGh the group votes 7, 8,o r9 (all choices that are
payoﬀ-equivalent in equilibrium). In equilibrium, Gl and Gh are (50,50).
The ﬁrst pair of diagrams in Figure 5 refers to C treatments; the second
30Cutpoints are now estimated so as to minimize the average distance (both in the experi-
mental data and in the theoretical random case). With a very large number of random voting
choices, the two cutpoints that minimize the expected errors’ distance are (50,50).T h ef r e -
quency of error is 2/3, with an average distance of 25, yielding an expected distance of 50/3.
The corresponding number in the experimental data is, for a given pair of cutpoints, the sum
of all errors’ distances, divided by K, the number of rounds in the experiment.
31The cutpoints estimates that minimize the number of monotonicity violations need not be
identical to those that minimize the errors’ distance. In practice, they diﬀer mostly in the case
of those subjects with more random behavior. The substance of the results does not change,
and we report here the cutpoints the minimize the number of violations, for consistency with
the discussion of individual behavior.
26row to C2 and the last to CChat. As in Figure 3b, darker points indicate
fewer monotonicity violations. Coordination aﬀects the cutpoints of the minor-
ity groups: none of the estimated cutpoints in treatments C2 and CChat lies
outside the 45 degree line, as opposed to what we observe in treatment C.T h u s
in treatments C2 and CChat, in accordance with equilibrium the behavior of
all minority groups is best described as voting either 2 (at lower values) or 6 (at
higher values) - albeit with dispersion around the equilibrium cutpoints (50,50).
The majority’s behavior, on the other hand, is best described as splitting the
bonus votes for some intermediate range of values, in all sessions. In addition,
the light shading of most points in the majority ﬁgures reﬂects the relatively
large number of monotonicity violations for any estimate of cutpoints. In the
case of the majority, then, coordination did not appear to have signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the choice of cutpoints. The results is somewhat surprising, but we need to
take into account, once again, the relative low cost of strategic mistakes for the
majority. With a single coordinated strategy, the expected percentage loss to
the majority from always splitting the bonus votes is about 8 percent when the
minority plays the equilibrium strategy. For the minority, on the other hand,
the expected cost of always splitting the bonus votes is between 20 and 100
percent, depending on the equilibrium mixture used by the majority.32
Taking together the analyses of both individual and group behavior, we
can draw three main conclusions. First, our results conﬁrm the importance of
monotonic voting behavior in realizing the potential eﬃciency of storable votes.
As in our previous experiments (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey, forthcoming), it
is this more intuitive requirement, relative to the full discipline of equilibrium
behavior, that keeps the experimental outcomes in line with the theoretical
predictions. Once again, storable votes appear robust to deviations from equi-
librium if monotonicity is satisﬁed. Second, the results on group behavior in
treatment C allow us to propose a stronger conjecture: for the most part, the
eﬃciency of the mechanism is preserved even in the presence of "some" viola-
tions of monotonicity, as long as these violations are not large. What matters
is that on average more votes are cast at higher values. When this requirement
is not satisﬁed, as in the outlier session c22 in treatment C2,t h ee ﬃciency loss
is clear. Third, the deviations from equilibrium are particularly costly to the
minority, whose payoﬀ, relative to the majority, falls short of the equilibrium
prediction in all but two sessions (ﬁgure 2a). The advantage of coordination in
inducing the minority towards the equilibrium strategy has a counterpart in ﬁg-
ure 2a, where CChat and C2 treatments almost always have smaller deviations
from the theoretical predictions than treatments B and C.
32The worst scenario for the minority is when the majority casts 5 votes for values below
50 and 7 votes for values above. The best scenario is when the majority votes either 5 or 9,
again with a threhsold of 50. Both are equilibrium strategies.
As for the majority, it is easy to verify that in the model with full coordination, its maximin
strategy entails splitting the bonus votes. It corresponds to cutpoints (25,100):c a s tn ob o n u s
votes for values below 25, but split the bonus votes for all values above 25.
27FI GURE 5 
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Majoritarian principles are a fundamental ingredient of democratic institutions.
But they carry with them the risk of disenfranchising minority groups and en-
dangering the stability of the system, by violating principles of both equity and
eﬃciency. In a well-designed democracy, a judicial system protecting the rights
of minority groups needs to be supplemented by political remedies that ensure
the minority a voice through the daily, ordered exercise of political rights. This
paper has analyzed the potential of a simple voting system - storable votes - to
fulﬁll this function. By granting voters a stock of votes to be divided as desired
over a series of multiple binary decisions, storable votes allow the minority to
cumulate votes on speciﬁc issues and to win sometime. Because the minority
wins only if its strength of preferences is high, and the majority’s is low, the
gains in terms of equity have little if any cost in terms of eﬃciency.
We have studied two related models where two groups of diﬀerent size have
consistently opposite preferences. In our "correlated" model, C, all members
of a group - whether the majority or the minority - agree not only on on the
direction of their preferences but also on the strength of their preferences. This
is the example presented in the Introduction: all members of group B,f o r
example, agree that it is more important to win issue 3 than to win issue 1. The
groups are very cohesive. If we think in terms of political parties, these would be
parties with strong discipline; more generally, the model is probably best suited
to represent groups with some level of organization, suﬃcient to agree on the
set of priorities. In our "basic" model, model B, on the other hand, all members
of a group agree on the direction of their preferences, and the two groups have
opposite preferences, but within a group the members’ priorities may diﬀer. For
example, some members of group B could have diﬀerent preferences from those
described in the Introduction, and consider issue 1 a higher priority than issue
3. The groups are not organized.
Although storable votes help in minority in both models, both the theory
and the experiments support the intuition that the minority fares better when
its members agree on priorities. The voting system is decentralized and coor-
dination can be a problem even when preferences are perfectly correlated - and
the minority does better in the experimental treatments with more coordina-
tion - but the larger eﬀect comes from the agreement on priorities. The minority
can only win if a suﬃcient number of its members all vote heavily on a given
issue. Agreeing on priorities is a very useful ﬁrst step in achieving that goal.
The literature on cumulative voting had conjectured a similar eﬀect: Guinier
(1994) states that cumulative voting favors well-organized minorities, and in
fact considers only well-organized minorities as deserving of special protection.
For both models, our experimental results conﬁrm the theoretical predic-
tions on voting outcomes: the frequency of minority victories, the payoﬀ to the
minority relative to the majority, the aggregate payoﬀ to all voters and the com-
parison to the aggregate payoﬀ under simple majority. They do not match the
theory in terms of behavior: especially among majority voters, we observe equi-
librium strategies only rarely. However, the monotonicity of voting strategies -
28more votes are cast when the strength of preferences is higher - is almost always
respected. Where it cannot be by design (in the aggregate majority group vote
of treatment C), monotonicity still characterizes individual voting choices, with
the result that deviations at the aggregate level, though not infrequent, are not
large. The eﬃciency costs from these deviation appear small. These ﬁndings
replicate our earlier conclusions from a set of storable votes experiments with
identical voters (Casella, Gelman and Palfrey, forthcoming). In the presence
of a systematic minority, the game is more complex and the replication of the
results is an encouraging sign of the robustness of storable votes.
There are many directions for further research. We limit ourselves to men-
tioning two. First, it would be interesting to compare storable votes to a larger
set of alternative mechanisms, both theoretically and experimentally. These al-
ternative mechanisms should include vetoes, serial dictatorship and potentially
ﬁrst-best mechanisms a la Jackson and Sonnenschein (forthcoming). Storable
votes are more ﬂexible but more complicated than vetoes, and less ﬂexible and
less complicated than the Jackson and Sonnenschein mechanism. Serial dictator-
ship requires a secondary mechanism to allocate decisions to speciﬁc individuals
or groups, not arbitrarily but in a somewhat eﬃcient fashion. What can the
theory tell us, and how would all compare experimentally? Second, the sensitiv-
ity of storable votes to agenda manipulation is an open question. The agenda
setting procedure should be part of the overall game, and voters will decide how
many votes to cast knowing how new issues are brought to a vote. A priori it is
not clear whether problems will arise: having multiple votes that can be shifted
across proposals may make the order of the proposals more important, but also
increase the ability to resist possible manipulations of this order. The addi-
tional consideration of political minorities may exacerbate possible problems,
either because majority losses are particularly expensive in terms of eﬃciency
or because the minority may end up unable to ever control any outcome.
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308A p p e n d i x
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that x∗
Mt(vi,B t,t) and x∗
mt(vi,B t,t) exist.
Consider candidate equilibrium strategies {x0








cause preferences between the two groups are always opposed, at any state only
the aggregate voting choice of the opposite group aﬀects voters’ payoﬀs. In
addition, because in model C preferences within each group are always per-
fectly correlated, by deﬁnition {x0
it(vi,B,t)},i∈ m maximize the expected pay-
oﬀ of each individual minority member, given x∗
Mt(vi,B,t) (and similarly for
{x0
it(vi,B,t)},i ∈ M,g i v e nx∗
mt(vi,B,t)). It follows that no individual devia-
tion from the prescribed strategies can be proﬁtable and {x0
it(vi,B t,t)} must be
equilibrium strategies. Note that in general the equilibrium will not be unique:
any permutation of individual strategies that leaves the aggregate vote for the
group unchanged, at given state, is an equilibrium. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .(i) Existence of equilibrium in pure strategies. Mil-
grom and Weber (1985) discuss conditions for existence of an equilibrium in
distributional strategies. In particular, conditional on a publicly observed vari-
able, individual types are required to be independent. The publicly observed
i n f o r m a t i o ni no u rc a s ei se a c hv o t e r ’ sm e m b e r s h i pi no n eo ft h et w og r o u p s ,
and hence the support of the distribution from which valuations are drawn.
Conditional on such support, individual valuations are independent in case B.
The arguments in Casella (2005), showing that the game satisﬁes all conditions
required by Milgrom and Weber remain applicable here. Hence an equilibrium
in pure strategies exists for model B. Conditional on public information on the
support of each distribution, valuations are independent in the two-voter version
of model C. Again, the arguments in Casella (2005) apply, and an equilibrium
in pure strategies exists. But since such an equilibrium must be an equilibrium
of the n-voter C game, it follows that an equilibrium in pure strategies of the
n-voter C game exists. (ii) Monotonicity of the equilibrium strategies. Call a
strategy monotonic if, at a given state, the number of votes cast is monoton-
ically increasing in the intensity of preferences vit. The argument in Casella,
Gelman and Palfrey (forthcoming) shows that at any given state all individual
best response strategies must be monotonic when members of each group do not
play correlated strategies. Thus the argument applies immediately to equilibria
of model B. It also applies to the two-voter version of model C, and hence to
group strategies, as opposed to individual strategies, in the equilibrium we focus
on in the n-voter C game. If, at any given state, all best response strategies
must be monotonic and an equilibrium exists, it follows that equilibrium strate-
gies must be monotonic. Because there is a continuum of types and a ﬁnite set
of strategies, then it must be that monotonic equilibrium strategies must take
the form of monotone cutpoint strategies. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . Consider any candidate equilibrium where the mi-
nority is expected to lose with probability 1 over each decision. A minority
member cannot be worse oﬀ by cumulating all his bonus votes on one decision.
31Over all decisions, there must be at least one where with positive probability
the majority casts no more than MB0/T bonus votes, and since the minority
can never cast fewer than m total votes, a deviating minority member can al-
ways ﬁnd a decision where with positive probability the diﬀerence in votes cast
is at most M(1 + B0/T) − m. Thus with positive probability the outcome of
that decision changes and deviation is proﬁtable if M(1 + B0/T) ≤ m + B0,
or B0(1 − M/T) ≥ M − m. This condition requires T>M ,a n di nt h i sc a s e
becomes B0 ≥ T(M − m)/(T − M). Note that the condition is suﬃcient and
applies to both models B and C. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . Consider the following strategy for each voter on
either side: cast only the regular vote over the ﬁrst T −2 decisions; at T −1,c a s t
all bonus votes if vi >α(i ∈ {m,M}), for a ﬁxed α>0, and none otherwise;
cast all remaining votes in the last election. We show in step (i) that if m>2
then there exists a B0 for which such strategies are equilibrium strategies. We
then show in (ii) that in such an equilibrium EV0 >E W 0 if m>M / 2.
(i). Suppose all other voters are following such a strategy. In the ﬁrst T −2
periods, m + B0 <M(or B0 <M− m)i ss u ﬃcient to rule out deviation by
a minority voter, because he can cast at most all his bonus votes. In period
T −1, B0 <M−m is again suﬃcient to rule out deviation by a minority voter if
vm <α , because the voter can hope to overturn the decision in minority’s favor
only if the majority is not using its bonus votes. But note that the condition
is also suﬃcient to rule out deviation when vm >αbecause in such a case a
minority voter can be tempted to withdraw some or all of his bonus votes only if
b yd o i n gs oh ec a no v e r t u r naT-period decision against the minority, or, again,
only if m + B0 <M . Majority voters always win the ﬁrst T − 2 decisions. At
T − 1,i fvM <α , a majority member can be tempted to cast some or all of his
bonus votes only if by doing so he can turn in majority’s favor a decision that
would otherwise be won by the minority. Thus a suﬃcient condition ruling out
such a deviation is: M +B0 <m (1+B0),o rB0 > (M −m)/(m−1).A si nt h e
case of the minority, the condition is also suﬃcient to rule out deviation when
vM >α . Thus for all m>2,t h e r ee x i s t sB0 ∈ ((M − m)/(m − 1),M − m)
such that the strategies are equilibrium strategies for all voters. Note that
M + B0 <m (1 + B0) implies M<m (1 + B0): the minority wins at T − 1 if
(vmT−1 >α , v MT−1 <α ), and wins at T if (vmT−1 <α , v MT−1 >α ).T h e
majority wins at all other times.




























































Note that the left-hand side simpliﬁes to M
R 1
0 vdF(v) when evaluated at either
α =0or α =1 , since in both cases the majority always wins (and thus EV0 =
EW0). Taking the derivative of (A1) with respect to α and evaluating it at
α =0 ,w eo b t a i n :
∂(EV0 − EW0)
∂α





vdF(v)(2m − M) > 0 ⇔ m>M / 2
Thus if m>M / 2 there exists a threshold α>0 such that the strategies
described above lead to higher ex ante welfare than simple majority voting. ¤
Example. Model B.
(A) Equilibrium. To verify that the strategy described is an equilibrium,
consider the best response for voter i.I f i casts xi1 votes in the vote over
the ﬁrst proposal, his expected utility over the whole game is: EUi|xi1 =
vi1prob(W1|xi1)+E(v)prob(W2|4 − xi1) where prob(Wt|xit) is i’s probability
of obtaining the desired outcome in period t conditional on casting xit votes,
and E(v)=0 .5.S i n c e(n−1) is an even number, and every other voter is cast-
ing either 1 or 3 votes, the diﬀerence in votes between the two sides, excluding
i, must be even for both proposals. Thus, when i considers the choice between
casting 3, 2 or 1 v o t e s ,t h eo n l yc a s ei nw h i c ht h ec h o i c em a t t e r si sad i ﬀerence
of 2 votes in his side disfavor, either over proposal 1 or proposal 2:
EUi|3 >E U i|2 ⇔ vi1[prob(∆x1−i =2 ) ]> 0.5[prob(∆x2−i =2 ) ]
EUi|2 >E U i|1 ⇔ vi1[prob(∆x1−i =2 ) ]> 0.5[prob(∆x2−i =2 ) ]
(where ∆x1−i indicates the number of votes by which i’s side is losing, absent i’s
vote). Given the symmetry of F(v), in the candidate equilibrium the probability
33of any other voter casting 1 or 3 votes is identical, implying: prob(∆x1−i =2 )=
prob(∆x2−i =2 ) .T h u s i’s best response is to cast 1 vote if vi1 < 0.5 and 3
votes if vi1 > 0.5; the conclusion holds for all i, and the strategy is indeed an
equilibrium. If M>3m, prob(∆x1−i =2 )=prob(∆x2−i =2 )=0 ,a n dt h e
number of votes cast is irrelevant.
(B) Frequency of minority victories. Write the majority size as M = m +
2k − 1,w i t hk ≥ 1 (recall than n is odd). The minority wins the ﬁrst vote
if there are at least k more valuations above 0.5 among the minority than the
majority. Given the symmetry of the Uniform, the probability of this event is
given by the formula in the text. The minority wins the second vote if there are
at least k more valuations below 0.5 over the ﬁrst proposal among the minority
than the majority, an event that again, given the symmetry of the Uniform
distribution, has the probability given in the text. Note that k must be smaller
than m, implying that the majority always wins if M ≥ 3m.
(C) Eﬃcient frequency of minority victories. A c c o r d i n gt oo u re ﬃciency cri-
terion, the minority should win whenever the sum of its valuations is larger than
the sum of the majority’s valuations. Call y (z)t h es u mo fm (M) independent
random variables, each distributed Uniformly over [0,1].T h ee ﬃcient frequency

















(y − s)m−1sign(y − s) (A2)
(and correspondingly for PM(z)).
(D) Expected payoﬀ. (i) Equilibrium. With n odd and the equilibrium strate-
gies described above, the diﬀerence in votes cast by the two groups is always an
even number. In addition, the symmetry of the Uniform distribution guarantees
that the probability of any given diﬀerence in votes is equal over the two pro-
posals. If we call prob(WM|x) the probability of obtaining the desired outcome
for i ∈ M, conditional on casting x votes, we can write the ex ante expected
payoﬀ of a majority member as:
EVBi =( 3 /8)prob(WM|1) + (5/8)prob(WM|3) ∀i ∈ M
where prob(WM|1) = prob(xM−i ≥ xm) and prob(WM|3) = prob(xM−i ≥ xm −
2).R e c a l lt h a tM = m+2k−1. Given the equilibrium strategies, the symmetry
of the Uniform distribution, and the independence of the valuation draws, if we
call "high" a valuation above 0.5, prob(xM−i ≥ xm) equals the probability that
the number of high draws in the minority group is at most k − 1 higher than
for the majority group, excluding voter i:














Similarly, prob(xM−i ≥ xm −2) equals the probability that the number of high
draws in the minority group is at most k higher than for the majority group,
34excluding voter i:














Analogous calculations yield the ex ante expected payoﬀ of a minority mem-
ber:































Having derived the ex ante expected payoﬀ of a majority and a minority member,
respectively - payoﬀs that are reported in Figure 2 - we can write the ex ante
aggregate expected payoﬀ in equilibrium as EVB = M(EVBi)+m(EVBj), i ∈
M, j ∈ m.
(ii) First best eﬃciency. For each proposal, the ex ante eﬃcient aggregate
payoﬀ EU∗


















Over the two proposals, the ex ante eﬃcient payoﬀ is 2EU∗
B.T h e ﬁrst term
in (A3) corresponds to the eﬃcient expected payoﬀ for the minority group,
and the second for the majority group. The corresponding per capita values
(multiplied by 2) are plotted in Figure 1b. (iii) Simple majority voting. With
simple majority voting, the majority always wins. Its expected payoﬀ equals
the aggregate expected payoﬀ and is given by:
R M
0 zPM(z)dz = M/2 or M over
the 2 proposals. (iv) Random choice. If each group has a ﬁfty percent chance of
winning any vote, the aggregate expected payoﬀ is 1/2(M/2) + 1/2(m/2) over
each proposal, or (M + m)/2 for the 2-proposal game.
Example. Model C.
(A) Equilibrium. The majority can ensure itself victory over all proposals
if 2M>3m.S u p p o s e t h e n 2M ≤ 3m.W h e n xm = m, the minority always
loses (m<max{M,m +3 } < min{3M,4M − (m +3 ) }). The only possible
deviation for a minority member is to cast 2 or 3 votes when xm−i = m − 1,
but m +2< max{M,m+3 } < min{3M,4M − (m +3 ) }: the deviation cannot
be proﬁtable. The majority always wins when casting min{3M,4M −(m+3)}
votes, but loses when xM =m a x {M,m+3 } if xm =3 m. A majority member
could deviate and use his bonus votes when xM−i =m a x {M − 1,m+2 }.B u t
35casting 2 votes cannot be proﬁtable: with 2M ≤ 3m, max{M +1,m+4} < 3m.
And neither can casting 3:w i t h2M ≤ 3m,e i t h e rmax{M +2,m+5} < 3m and
min{3M −2,4M −(m+5)} > 3m, in which case the outcomes are unchanged;
or max{M +2 ,m+5 } > 3m and min{3M − 2,4M − (m +5 ) } < 3m,i nw h i c h
case the certainty of winning at vM > 0.5 is traded for the certainty of winning
in the future, with E(v)=0 .5 - a net loss in expected utility.
(B) Frequency of minority victories. If 2M ≤ 3m the minority wins the ﬁrst
vote if (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 < 0.5)a n dt h es e c o n di f( vm1 < 0.5∩ vM1 > 0.5)-g i v e n
the symmetry of the Uniform distribution, it wins each vote with probability
0.25.
(C) Eﬃcient frequency of minority victories. Given the perfect correlation
of valuations within each group, the eﬃcient frequency of minority victories is




0 dvMdvm = m/(2M).
(D) Expected payoﬀ. (i) Equilibrium. If 2M>3m,t h em a j o r i t ya l w a y sw i n s
and the expected aggregate payoﬀ over the two proposals equals M.I f2M ≤
3m, the expected aggregate payoﬀ equals: (1/4)(M/4+M/2) + (1/4)(3M/4+
M/2) + (1/4)(3M/4+m/2) + (1/4)(3m/4+M/2) = (13M +5 m)/16 (where
the ﬁrst term is the expected payoﬀ over the two proposals when (vm1 < 0.5∩
vM1 < 0.5), the second when (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 > 0.5), the third when (vM1 >
0.5∩ vm1 < 0.5), and the fourth when (vm1 > 0.5∩ vM1 < 0.5)-a l le v e n t s
with probability 1/4). (ii) First best eﬃciency. In model C we can represent
the total valuation of the minority (majority) group by a random variable y
(z), Uniformly distributed over [0,m] ([0,M]). The eﬃcient aggregate expected




























Over the two proposals, the ex ante eﬃcient payoﬀ is 2EU∗
C.T h e ﬁrst term
in (A4) corresponds to the eﬃcient expected payoﬀ for the minority group
(m2/(3M)), and the second for the majority group ((3M2 − m2)/6M). The
corresponding per capita values (multiplied by 2) are plotted in Figure 1b. (iii)
Simple majority voting. With simple majority voting, the majority always wins,
and its expected payoﬀ, which equals the aggregate expected payoﬀ,i sg i v e nb y : R M
0
z
Mdz = M/2 or M over the 2 proposals. (iv) Random choice. If each group
has a ﬁfty percent chance of winning any vote, the aggregate expected payoﬀ
is 1/2(M/2) + 1/2(m/2) over each proposal, or (M + m)/2 for the 2-proposal
game.
36SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS (CChat1)
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision making experiment,
and for arriving on time. During the experiment we require your complete,
undistracted attention, and ask that you follow instructions carefully. You may
not open other applications on your computer, chat with other students, or
engage in other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading books,
etc.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Diﬀerent participants may earn diﬀerent amounts. What you earn depends
partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and
all interaction between you will take place through the computers. It is impor-
tant that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants
during the experiments.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction
period, you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will
be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the
instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud
so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has begun,
raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
The experiment you are participating in is a voting experiment, where you
will be asked to allocate a budget of several votes over two diﬀerent proposals.
We will begin with a practice session. The practice session will be followed
by the paid session, which will consist of 20 matches. Each match will have
elections for two diﬀerent proposals, and you will receive a new budget of votes
at the beginning of each match.
At the end of the paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you have
earned, plus a show-up fee of $10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and you
are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings
during the experiment are denominated in FRANCS. Your DOLLAR earnings
are determined by multiplying your earnings in FRANCS by a conversion rate.
For this experiment the conversion rate is 0.01, meaning that 100 FRANCS
equal 1 DOLLAR.
DESCRIPTION
At the beginning of the ﬁrst match, you will be randomly assigned with 4
other persons in the room to form a 5-voter committee, which votes over two
diﬀerent proposals, in sequence. Of the 5 voters of this committee, 2 voters
belong to the FOR group; the remaining 3 voters belong to the AGAINST
group. Whether you belong to the FOR or to the AGAINST group is decided
randomly by the computer and will be displayed on your computer monitor.
The groups not only diﬀer in size, but also diﬀer in their preference over
proposals. Speciﬁcally, all voters in the FOR group are always in favor of all
proposals; all voters in the AGAINST group are always against all proposals.
Each voter is given one “regular” vote to cast in each of the two proposal
elections. You must always use this vote in each proposal election. In addition,
37each voter is given a total of 2 “bonus votes” at the beginning of each match
that you will use in addition to the regular votes.
The ﬁrst proposal your committee votes on is called Proposal A. You may
cast up to 3 votes in the A election (your regular A vote plus either 0, 1, or
2 of your bonus votes.) Before proceeding to the vote, you are assigned your
personal Proposal A value. If your value is positive, you are in favor of Proposal
A; if your value is negative, you are against Proposal A. Each voter of the FOR
group is in favor of Proposal A and has a positive value for Proposal A which
is equally likely to be any amount between 1 and 100 francs. Every member of
the FOR group is assigned the SAME Proposal A value by the computer. Each
voter of the AGAINST group is against Proposal A and has a negative value
for Proposal A which is equally likely to be any amount between -1 and -100
francs. Every member of the AGAINST group is assigned the same Proposal A
value by the computer.
If you are in the FOR group, you earn your value if A passes. If you are
in the AGAINST group, you earn the absolute value of your value if A does
not pass. For example, if your are in the AGAINST group and your proposal
A value is —55, then you earn 55 francs if A does not pass, and 0 francs if A
passes. A passes if there are more YES votes than NO votes in the A election.
A does not pass if there are more NO votes than YES votes. Ties are broken
randomly. In this example, you also know that the other two members of the
AGAINST group also have Proposal A values of —55.
After being told your proposal A value, you will be allowed two minutes to
exchange messages with the other members of your group. The messages you
send and receive are not seen by members of the other group. They are private
messages within your group. The messages must conform to the following rules.
1. Your messages must be relevant to the experiment. Do not engage in social
chat. 2. You are not permitted to send messages that are intended to reveal
your identity or participant ID number. 3. The use of threatening or oﬀensive
language, including profanity, is not permitted.
At any time during this 2 minute period, you can make your individual
voting decision. You must decide whether to cast 1 vote, 2 votes, or 3 votes in
the proposal A election. If you are in the FOR group, any votes you cast will be
automatically counted as YES votes for A. If you are in the AGAINST group,
any votes you cast will be automatically counted as NO votes.
The experimenter will announce when the two minute period is ﬁnished. If
you haven’t yet voted, please vote when the announcement is made, so we can
all proceed to the next proposal. You are not told how the other people have
voted until after you cast your vote, although you are free to say whatever you
wish about your voting decision to the other members of your group during the
two minute message stage.
Whatever bonus votes you do not use in the A election, will be saved for
you to use in the proposal B election. For example, if you cast 1 vote in the
A election, all your bonus votes will be saved for the B election. If you cast 2
votes in the A election, only 1 of your bonus votes will be saved, and if you cast
3 votes in the A election, none of your bonus votes are saved.
38After you and the other voters in your committee have made voting decisions,
you are told the outcome of the proposal A election, and the total number of
votes FOR and AGAINST. You then proceed to the proposal B election. You are
in the same committee for the proposal B election as you were for the proposal
A election. In addition, if you were in the FOR group in the A election, you
r e m a i ni nt h eF O Rg r o u pi nt h eBe l e c t i o n( a n di fy o uw e r ei nt h eA G A I N S T
group, you remain in the AGAINST group).
There is no message stage for Proposal B. When you and the voters in your
committee are ready to proceed, you will each be assigned proposal B values
in the same manner that your proposal A values were assigned. Each voter’s
assigned value for proposal B will typically be diﬀerent than their proposal A
values. All voters in the FOR group still receive positive values, and these values
are the same for all members of the FOR group. All voters in the AGAINST
group receive negative values, and these values are the same for all members of
the AGAINST group. All your remaining votes will automatically be cast as
Y E Sv o t e sf o rp r o p o s a lBi fy o ua r eaF O Rv o t e r ,a n da sN Ov o t e si fy o ua r e
an AGAINST voter. The outcome of the B election is then reported to you.
When everyone has ﬁnished this completes the ﬁrst match, and we will then
go to the next match. You will be rematched with 4 other people to form a new
5-person committee, and repeat the procedure described above. The voters in
your new committee will be selected randomly by the computer, but if you were
aF O Rv o t e ri nt h eﬁrst committee, you will still be a FOR voter for the rest
of the experiment. And if you were an AGAINST voter in the ﬁrst match, you
will still be in the AGAINST group for the rest of the experiment. As in the
ﬁrst match, your new committee has 2 FOR voters and 3 AGAINST voters.
A f t e ry o u rn e wc o m m i t t e eh a sﬁnished voting on both proposals in the second
match, you will again be rematched into a new committee in a similar way, and
this will continue for 30 matches. Remember that each match consists of 2
proposals, every committee has 2 FOR voters and 3 AGAINST voters. Also
remember, if you are a FOR voter, you will always be a FOR voter, and if you
are an AGAINST voter, you will always be an AGAINST voter.
PRACTICE SESSION
We will now give you a chance to get used to the computers with a brief
practice session. Are there any questions before we begin the practice match?
[ANSWER QUESTIONS]
You will not be paid for this practice session; it is just to allow you to get
familiar with the experiment and your computers. During the practice session,
do not press any keys or click with your mouse, unless instructed to. When we
instruct you, please do exactly as we ask. We will now hand out record sheets
for you to record important information during the experiment. Please raise
your hand if you need a pen or pencil.
HAND OUT RECORD SHEETS AND PENS AND COLLECT YELLOW
CARDS
Please pull out your dividers so we can begin the practice session.
[START GAME on SERVER]
FIRST PPT SLIDE
39This is the decision screen for Proposal A in match 1. Your ID# is printed
at the very top left of your screen. Please record this on your record sheet.
The screen tells you your proposal A value, whether you are in the FOR
group or in the AGAINST group, and the number of people in each group
(always 2 for the FOR group and 3 for the AGAINST group in this experiment).
Then the screen tells you the number of votes you have available. The bottom
window of your screen is the history table, which is blank now because nothing
has happened yet.
Please record your proposal A value on your record sheet in the row labeled
“Practice 1 A”. Rememer that everyone in your group has the same value as
you do. That is, everyone in the FOR group of your committee has the same
positive proposal A value in this round, and everyone in the AGAINST group
of your committee has the same negative proposal A value this round. For
example, if you are in the FOR group and your proposal A value is 41, then
this tells you that both of the other members of your committee’s FOR group
in your committee also have a proposal A value equal to 41. The AGAINST
group members of your committee also share a proposal A value, but all you
would know is that it is some negative number between -1 and -100.
It is important that you understand how these values are assigned. Are there
any questions before we proceed with the practice round?
After recording this information, we begin the 2 minute message stage. Mes-
sages are entered by typing on the line at the very bottom of the screen and
then clicking the send button. Everyone please practice this once by sending
the message “Hello” now. Notice that this is echoed in the message display box,
and your message is also displayed on your screen. Also notice that each of
your have been assigned a temporary number that identiﬁes you anonymously
to the other members of your group. For example, the two members in a FOR
group, are assigned temporary id numbers 1 and 2. The three members in the
AGAINST group are assigned temporary id numbers 1, 2, and 3.
At any time during the 2 minute message stage, you may choose how many
votes to cast in the A election, by clicking on the arrow key. You may cast
either 1, 2, or 3 votes in this election. Any unused votes in this election will be
saved for you to use in the B election of this match.
If your proposal A value is positive, then all votes you cast will count as
YES votes for A, and if your proposal A value is negative, then all votes you
cast will count as NO votes. When you have selected the number of votes you
wish to cast in this election, please click on the “vote” button. Please record the
number of votes you cast on your record sheet. Then wait for all other voters
in the room to ﬁnish casting their Proposal A votes. The proposal passes if
there are more YES votes than NO votes. Tie votes are broken randomly by
the computer.
SECOND PPT SLIDE
The experimenter will announce when the 2 minute message stage is over.
Please make your voting decision at this time, if you have not done so already.
Once everyone has made their vote decision for the A election, the votes are
tallied and the results for your match are displayed in the results window. The
40window displays your Proposal A value, the number of votes you cast, the
total number of YES votes cast in the election, the total number of NO votes,
the outcome, and your payoﬀ from the A election. Please record all of this
information on your record sheet.
Then click OK when you are ready to proceed to the proposal B election.
THIRD PPT SLIDE
We are now in the B election. Notice that the history screen has been
updated and includes a summary of the previous proposal A election. There is no
message stage for Proposal B, and your voting decision is determined completely
by how many votes you cast in the A election. But you will need to read the
information on the screen and record it. Please record your proposal B value
on your record sheet in the row labeled “Practice 1 B”. This screen reminds
you how many votes you have remaining. This number equals the number of
bonus votes you did not use for proposal A plus your regular proposal B vote.
Please record this number on your record sheet in the column labeled “your
vote”. Then click on the “Vote” button. All these votes are now automatically
cast by the computer. They are recorded as YES votes for proposal B if you
are in the FOR group, and as NO votes if you are in the AGAINST group.
FOURTH PPT SLIDE
Once everyone has made their vote decision for the B election, the votes
are tallied and the results for the people in your committee are displayed in
the results window. The screen displays the number of YES votes and the
number of NO votes, the outcome, and your payoﬀ in francs. Please record this
information on your record sheet.
Please press OK when you are ready to proceed.
FIFTH PPT SLIDE
Once everybody has pressed OK, a new window appears and displays what
your dollar payoﬀ would have been if this were a paid match instead of a practice
match. It also displays your total dollar payoﬀ from all previous matches, which
so far is zero. You do not need to record your cumulative payoﬀ after each match.
But you will need to record it at the very end of the experiment. Please press
OK when you are ready to proceed.
We have now completed the ﬁrst practice match. We will now proceed to the
second practice match. Remember that you are assigned to a new committee
in this match, although you will continue to be a FOR voter if you were a FOR
voter in the ﬁrst committee; you will continue to be an AGAINST voter if you
were an AGAINST voter in the ﬁrst committee. Everyone is randomly assigned
to a new committee after every match in the experiment. Notice that the full-
view history contains the information about what you did in the ﬁrst match.
Please raise your hand if your history screen does not show this information.
Please complete the second practice match on your own, by following the
same directions as in the ﬁrst practice match. Don’t forget to record the in-
formation as it appears on your screen. Remember, you are not paid for these
practice matches. Feel free to raise your hand if you have any questions.
When everyone has made their vote decisions for proposal A and proposal B
in this practice match, and the screen with the proposal B results has appeared
41at the end of the match, please wait for further instructions. Do NOT click OK
on that screen.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO COMPLETE PRACTICE MATCH 2]
Practice match 2 is now over. Please press OK to go to the ﬁnal screen of
the practice session, displaying your payoﬀ from the current match, and your
total payoﬀ in the experiment so far. Do not press OK yet. You do not need
to record your total payoﬀ because this was a practice session. You will have to
record it at the end of the paid session. Any questions?
Please press OK when you are ready to proceed.
If you have any questions from now on, raise your hand, and an experimenter
will come and assist you.
Please pull out the dividers to ensure your privacy and the privacy of others.
Please click OK and begin the ﬁrst paid match.
(Play matches 1 — 20)
This completes the experiment. Please make sure to record your total payoﬀs
on your record sheet, including your $10 show-up fee. Please remain in your
seat and we will come by to check your total. Do not use the computers or talk
with each other. We will pay each of you in private in the next room in the
order of your seat numbers. Please sign and turn in your record sheet when you
receive payment. You are under no obligation to reveal your earnings to the
other participants. Thank you for your participation.
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